Sustainable Development in the Third World: A New Paradigm? by Gentry, Terry A.
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
5-25-1995
Sustainable Development in the Third World: A New Paradigm?
Terry A. Gentry
Portland State University
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of
PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gentry, Terry A., "Sustainable Development in the Third World: A New Paradigm?" (1995). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 4905.
10.15760/etd.6781
THESIS APPROVAL 
The abstract and thesis of Terry A. Gentry for the Master of Science in Political Science 
were presented May 25, 1995, and accepted by the thesis committee and the department. 
COMMITIBE APPROVALS: 
Mel Gurto~hair 
ohamed Wader 
Richard Brinkman 
Representative of the Office of Graduate Studies 
DEPARTMENT APPROVAL: 
Scott, Chair 
epartment of Political Science 
******************************************** 
ACCEPTED FOR PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY BY THE LIBRARY 
by on /9~~/995' 
ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Terry A. Gentry for the Master of Science in Political Science 
presented May 25, 1995. 
Title: Sustainable Development in the Third World: A New Paradigm? 
Over the past decade '"Sustainable Development" (SD) has emerged as the latest 
development catchphrase. A wide range of nongovernmental as well as governmental 
organizations have embraced it as the new paradigm of development. A review of the 
literature that has sprung up around the concept of SD indicates, however, a lack of 
consistency in its interpretation. More important, while the all-encompassing nature of 
the concept gives it political strength, its current formulation by the mainstream of SD 
thinking contains significant weaknesses. These include an incomplete perception of the 
problems of poverty and environmental degradation, and confusion about the role of 
economic growth and about the concept of sustainability. 
The purpose of this study was to identify common elements in a political 
economy of the environment, relating environmental change to the dynamics of ideology 
and policy, and at different levels of political complexity. The intention was to provide a 
structural analysis of the environment in which the development process illuminates 
environmental change at both a philosophical and material level. 
I 
The problem in achieving SD was related to the overriding structures of the 
international economic system, which have arisen out of the exploitation of 
environmental resources, and which frequently operate as constraints on the achievement 
of long-term sustainable practices. Insufficient accounting of ecological aspects of 
economic growth and development has resulted from intellectual traditions, where 
solutions are formulated, point in different directions. 
Conclusions are drawn that SD involves trade-offs between biological, economic 
and social systems and is found in the interactive zone between these systems. There are 
a number of international factors that may be necessary, but insufficient, conditions for 
SD on a national level, including peace, debt reduction, and more propitious terms of 
trade. There was seen dilemmas relating to SD, including the role of growth as the 
unquestioned objective of economic policy. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade a central concept in the debate about 
environmental protection and development has been sustainable 
development (SD). The term SD has become something of a 
buzzword for politicians, scholars, practitioners and participants m 
development. The usually ill-defined language of SD has become 
endemic, appearing with as much frequency in World Bank 
publications as in the rhetoric of grass-roots movements. I It 
appears to have gained the broad-based support that earlier 
development concepts such as "ecodevelopment" lacked, and is 
poised to become the dominant development paradigm. 
But murmurs of disenchantment are also being heard. 
"What is SD?" is being asked with increasing frequency without, 
however, clear answers forthcoming. SD is in real danger of 
becoming a cliche like appropriate technology -- a fashionable 
phrase that people pay homage to but which nobody clearly 
understands. As Mostafa Tolba has lamented, SD has become "an 
article of faith, a shibboleth; often used, but little explained. "2 
1 For example, World Bank, (1992). The Development Report, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.; and Turner, B.L.; Clark, W.C., Kates, R.B., Richards, J.F., 
Mathews, J.T., and Meyer, W.B. (eds) (1990), The Earth as Transformed by 
Human Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
2 Tolba, Mostafa ( 1987). Sustainable Development: Constraints and 
Opportunities, Butterworths, London, p. 2. 
3 
Crisis in the Third World 
Crisis has become a commonplace motif of development 
writing.3 The perception of dramatic and unsolvable problems m 
the countries of the "South" is common to politicians, aid agencies, 
academic analysts, and the media. The 1984 drought in Sahelian 
Africa intensified this perception, leading to astonishing individual 
generosity of those people unkindly (but perhaps accurately) 
described as "the fat and happy in rich countries."4 This indicates 
the disturbingly durable nature of the resulting picture of 
poverty: it seems possible for the Third World to be perceived as 
being locked in a permanent state of crisis of politics, economics 
and environmental degradation. 
This view of crisis tends to favor "firefighting" approaches to 
development as against discussions of deeper ills, and the 
treatment of symptoms rather than causes. Thus Julius Nyerere 
commented in 1985: "Africa starvation is topical, but the relations 
between rich and poor countries which underlie Africa's 
vulnerability to natural disasters have been relegated to the 
3 See for example, Ekins, Paul (1992). A New World Order: Grassroots 
Movements for Global Change, Routledge, New York; Timberlake, Lloyd 
( 1987). Only One Earth: Living for the Future, BBC and Earthscan, London; 
and Anderson, D.M. and Grove, R.H. (eds.) (1987) Conservation in Africa: 
People, Policies and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
4 Harrell-Bond, B. (1985). "Humanitarianism in a Straightjacket", African 
Affairs, vol. 84, no. 2, pp. 3-14. 
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sidelines of world discussion."5 The magnitude of problems and 
the failure of conventional economic thought and the 
bureaucracies to solve them has made SD widely attractive. 
Literature on the Third World suggests that there are two 
distinct crises, of development and environment. The crisis of 
development, or the lack of it, is perhaps the better studied. It 
embraces the problems of debt, falling commodity prices, falling 
per capita food production, growing poverty and socio-economic 
differentials both within Third World states and between 
countries. The dimensions of the problems facing the Third World 
are substantial and real enough. The litany of statistics is grimly 
familiar. UNICEF has estimated that 15 million children die each 
year because of the inability to satisfy their basic human 
subsistence needs. A recent World Resources Institute study 
estimates that 20.4 million hectares of tropical forest are 
destroyed annually. Particularly affected by these increased 
rates, according to the WRI, are the forests of Brazil, Costa Rica, 
India, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Average 
population per doctor was 15,000 in low income countries in 
compared to 554 in the industrial North.6 Obviously, the accuracy 
and usefulness of aggregate statistics of this sort are limited. 
5 Nyerere, Julius (1985). "Africa and the Debt Crisis", African Affairs, vol. 
84, no. 2, pp. 489-98. 
6 UNICEF (1993). The Progress of Nations, UNICEF, New York, p. 6; World 
Resources Institute, World Resources 1990-1991, Oxford University Press, 
New York, p. 34; World Bank (1984). World Development Report 1984, Oxford 
University Press, New York. p. 25; 
Nonetheless, the overall picture of the essentially human 
dimension of the Third World's crisis is clear. 
5 
Analyses of the cause of the problems behind this crisis of 
development vary. On one side there is a great diversity of 
critical analysts, for example Lappe, Korten, and Frobel, who 
identify a crisis of "the world capitalist system as a whole, 
including much of the Third World too. "7 On the other side are the 
world financial institutions, spearheaded by the implacable 
economists of the World Bank. In 1984 they commented that the 
recession was over, having lasted from 1980 to 1983 the "longest 
in fifty years." However, it provided "many valuable lessons for 
economic policy because it highlighted long-standing weaknesses 
in every economy and in international arrangements", and had 
lessons to teach if recovery was to mature into "sustained and 
rapid growth of the kind the world enjoyed for twenty-five years 
after World War Two. "8 
One measure of the development crisis is Third World 
indebtedness. Unlike the previous shorter recession in 1974-5, 
the amount of foreign capital (in the form of aid or commercial 
loans) available to Third World countries declined rapidly after 
1981, while the indebtedness rose. The external public debt of 
7Frobel, F., J. Heinrichs, and 0. Kreye (1985). "The Global Crisis and 
Developing Countries", pp. 111-24 in H. Addo et al. Development as Social 
Transformation: Reflections on the Global Problematique, Hodder and 
Stoughton, New York, p. 112. 
8world Bank (1984). Op. Cit. p. 1. 
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low income Third World countries (excluding China and India) 
rose from about 21 percent of GNP in 1970 to over 28 percent in 
1982, with no less than seven countries having a debt of over 50 
percent of GNP (Mauritania an unbelievable 146 percent; Togo, 
104 percent; Mali, 79 percent; and Zaire, 78 percent).9 The 
situation in middle-income countries was if anything worse, with 
a significant rise in average indebtedness and debt larger than 
GNP in Mauritania, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. There is also a 
significant relationship between the debt crisis and Third World 
poverty levels. IO 
Set against the grim picture of intensifying debt in the early 
1980s was the failure of agriculture to keep pace with foodgrain 
production. Sub-Saharan Africa was particularly hard hit, with 
intense droughts in the Sahel and elsewhere in the continent in 
the early 1970s and the early 1980s. Agricultural heavily favored 
those farmers using "green revolution" technology. The evidence 
suggests that per capita food production fell in sub-Saharan Africa 
consistently through the 1960s and 1970s. 
The second crisis of the Third World is environmental. It 
embraces desertification and fuelwood shortage, and logging of 
tropical rainforest. Some analysts recognize a third crisis, of 
9Jbid. p. 246. 
10 For a discussion on Third World debt and the IMF see, Payer, Cheryl 
(1974). The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World, Monthly Review Press, 
New York; Oxf am America ( 1986) "Third World Debt: Payable in Hunger", 
Facts for Action 16. 
7 
energy, separating out fuel and particularly fuel wood problems .1 1 
These problems and others are widely reviewed and have become 
an important focus for environmental concern in the 1980s and 
1990s. From 1972 the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) published annual state of the environment reports on 
particular issues, and carried out a review of world environmental 
trends, ranging from atmospheric carbon dioxide and 
desertification to the quality of drinking water. These reports 
initially were deliberate attempts to address the problems of the 
Third World. The fundamental point was that development need 
not be impaired by environmental protection; integrated 
development planning and rational planning could resolve 
conflicts between environment and development. Furthermore, 
development was needed to improve the environment and this 
would require assistance, particularly money to pay for 
environmental safeguards, and reasonable prices for exports. I 2 
Environment and Development 
The danger of global crisis in development, environment and 
energy is a major theme of the Brundtland report. I 3 However, m 
practice, the fields of developmental and environmental studies 
11 Peet, John (1992). Energy and the Ecological Economics of 
Sustainability, Island Press, Washington, DC. 
12 Adams, William (1991). Green Development: Environment and 
Sustainability in the Third World, Routledge, New York, p. 38. 
13 World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). Our 
Common Future, Oxford University Press, New York. 
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are far from unified, often being remote from each other both 
conceptually and practically. So called "experts" rarely even claim 
expertise in both, and seldom understand linkages. I 4 
Sociologically, the two fields have their own separate cadres, their 
own self-contained arenas of education and theory formation, 
their own technical language, research agendas and, their own 
literature. Each represents a distinct culture. Although the two 
cultures obviously overlap a great deal, and indeed make 
confident inroads onto each other's territory with scant regard for 
the exact meaning or purpose of terminology, there is rarely if 
ever any integration. 
It is only within the last ten years that environment and 
development have been substantially linked. This has been done 
by arguing the need to set environmental resources and resource 
use in a social and political as well as an economic context. Radical 
political economy in particular offers a way of making the link. I 5 
Why has this linkage been so elusive for so long? One reason is 
the mechanistic thinking and chronic tunnel vision of economists. 
This is backed up by parochial and doctrinaire thinking by radical 
theorists, constrained by "oppositionism" and "determinism." I 6 
I4 Chambers, Robert (1983). Rural Development: Putting the Last First, 
Longman, London, p.1. 
I 5 Redclift, Michael (1987). Sustainable Development: Exploring the 
Contradictions, Methuen, New York. 
I 6 Corbridge, S.E. (1990). Capitalist World Development: a Critique of Radical 
Development Geography, Macmillan, London, pp. 26-30. 
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Behind this again lies a more general failure to cross disciplinary 
boundaries. 
Development crises and environmental crises exist side by 
side in the literature, and together on the ground, yet explanations 
often fail to intersect. There are close and reciprocal links 
between development, poverty and environment. The complex 
and multidisciplinary nature of these links makes them difficult to 
identify and define. They often go unnoticed, fall down the cracks 
between disciplines, or get ignored because they fit so awkwardly 
into the structures of traditional academic analysis or discourse. 
Nonetheless, in the real world these links are real enough. They 
explain why development policy often causes rather than cure 
environmental problems. Development and environmental 
degradation often form a deadly trap for the poor. 
Chambers argues that it is the plight of the poor that should 
set the agenda for development action, and in his approach to 
sustainability he directs attention to the concept of sustainable 
rural livelihoods, defined as the secure access to sufficient stocks 
and flows of food and cash to meet basic needs. He suggests that 
there are both moral and practical imperatives for making 
sustainable livelihood security the focus for development action. I 7 
Ultimately that is what SD should be about. Thus, the debate 
about the environment in the Third Word, like that about 
development, is inherently political. It is an illusion to believe 
17 Chambers, Robert (1983). Op. Cit., pp. 13-14. 
that environmental objectives stand apart from or can be met 
without engaging in politics 
10 
In exploring the relationship between development and the 
environment I will construct a model of how it has changed over 
time: a historical account of the environment and development. 
Equally important, is the need to make clear the international 
linkages which provide the transformation momentum behind 
environmental change. These international linkages involve the 
transfer of capital, labor, and natural resources. The exploration 
of SD is concerned with all three: capital and labor, as well as the 
"natural" resources that human beings have altered through their 
own eff orts.18 
In the pages that follow it will also be clear that the 
environment, whatever its geographic location, is socially 
constructed. The environment used by people in downtown 
Portland, Oregon, or hunters and gatherers in the Brazilian 
Amazon, is not merely located in different places; it means 
different things to those who use it. The environment is 
transformed by economic growth in a material sense but it is also 
continually transformed existentially, although we - the 
environmental users - often remain unconscious of the fact. A 
main function of this study is to evaluate the environmental 
change as a social process, inextricably linked with the expansion 
and contraction of the world economic system. 
18 Smith, N. (1984) Uneven Development, Blackwell, London, p. 17. 
1 1 
Since the late 1960s there has been considerable discussion 
of development, both as a concept and in concrete historical 
settings. Important differences exist between neo-classical and 
Marxist interpretations, and within each of these competing 
paradigms. In this thesis development is regarded as an historical 
process which links the exploitation of resources in the more 
industrialized countries with those of the South. The perspective 
adopted is that of political economy, in which the outcome of 
economic forces is clearly related to the behavior of people and 
the role of the state in accumulation.19 At the same time it is 
central to the argument of this thesis that development be subject 
to redefinition, since it is impossible for accumulation to take 
place within the global economic system without important 
environmental costs. SD, if it is to be an alternative to 
unsustainable development, which will be addressed in the next 
chapter, should imply a break with linear models of growth and 
accumulation that ultimately may undermine the planet's life 
support systems.20 Development is too closely associated with 
what has occurred in Western capitalist societies in the past, and 
in a handful of peripheral capitalist societies today. To appreciate 
the limitations of development as economic growth one needs to 
look beyond the confines of industrialized societies in the North. 
19 Redclift, Michael (1984). Development and the Environmental Crisis: Red 
or Green, Methuen, London, p. 15. 
20 Korten, David (1991). "Sustainable Development," World Policy Journal, 
vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 157-189. 
1 2 
It is essential to look at other cultures' concepts of environment 
and sustainability, including those of the technologically 
"primitive" societies which present-day development is 
undermining. 
This thesis attempts to identify common elements in a 
political economy of the environment relating environmental 
change to "superstructural" factors, such as ideology and policy, 
and at different levels of political complexity. The intention is to 
provide a structural analysis of the environment in which the 
development process illuminates environmental change in 
different societies at both a philosophical and material level. 
The structure of this study reflects the elaboration of this 
argument, beginning with the discussion of the concept of SD m 
chapter 2. In this chapter the origins and growth of SD are 
reviewed. 
Chapter 3, examines the dimensions of the global 
environmental from the perspective of international political 
economy, arguing that the process of development cannot be 
divorced from the international economic system in a specific 
historical phase. It is international economic structures, as well as 
intellectual traditions, which impede SD. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates how specific economic linkages have 
evolved between North and South, helping to establish 
environmental conditions for development and accompanying 
problems for Third World countries. This chapter then examines 
the explicit recognition that sustainability must be linked to 
development. 
Chapter 5 takes a close look at the environment 
1 3 
management approach which is directed at resolving, or reducing, 
the contradictions exposed by the development process. It 
discusses the relevance of environment management and 
conservation in developed countries for the experiences of 
developing countries. Improved analysis of both the impacts and 
the causes underlying environmental degradation remains crucial. 
Chapter 6 examines the concept of sustainability. It places 
sustainability in the theoretical context underpinning SD. In the 
process I will directly explore the contradiction, widely associated 
with SD, of economic growth being both the solution and the root 
cause of the problem. 
Finally, in the conclusion, the argument is restated and re-
examined, for its intellectual coherence. The thesis will 
concentrate on the way environmental issues ~re socially 
constructed under capitalism. If SD is founded on inconsistencies, 
how should they be resolved in practical policy terms? 
CHAPTER 2. THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
14 
The concept of SD has a complex pedigree. It came in to 
widespread use when the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED, also know as the Brundtland Commission) 
reported in 1987.21 However, it was the 1970s that saw the 
emergence of a major revision in development thinking that 
presented a fundamental challenge to the conventional consensus 
on development. In common with the call for a "basic needs 
strategy," this revision emphasized meeting the basic needs of the 
poor. 22 SD added the argument that "real" improvement cannot 
occur m Third World countries unless the strategies which are 
being formulated and implemented are environmentally 
sustainable over the long-term, are consistent with social values 
and institutions, and encourage "grassroots" participation in the 
development process. Thus, it is argued that "there will be no SD 
or meaningful growth without a clear commitment at the same 
time to preserve the environment and promote the rational use of 
resources. "23 Similarly, to be socially and culturally sustainable, 
"development must be gauged by the values [which] a society 
21 WCED ( 1987), Op. Cit. 
22 Stewart, Frances (1985). Planning to Meet Basic Needs, Macmillan, New 
York, pp. ix, 244. 
23 Tolba, Mostafa (1987). Op. Cit., p. 12. 
itself, or some member thereof, deems to be requisite for its 
health and welfare. "2 4 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
15 
Environment, held in Stockholm, is usually credited with 
popularizing the concept of SD, although Caldwell suggests that the 
origins of the term probably lie in the Paris "Biosphere 
Conference" and the Washington, DC, conference on the Ecological 
Aspects of International Development, both of which were held in 
1968.25 In general, the concern expressed at these conferences 
was that, 
few if any countries take adequate account of 
environmental considerations when making policy or 
planning development. Few allocate or regulate uses 
of living resources so as to ensure that they are 
environmentally appropriate and sustainable. Many 
lack either the financial or technical resources, or the 
political will, or adequate legislative, institutional, or 
public, support for conservation (or any combination 
of these) to carry out fully the conservation measures 
required. 2 6 
Whatever the origins of SD, the Brundtland Commission was 
the political turning-point, making the concept one of geopolitical 
24Goulet, Dennis (1971). The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of 
Development, Atheneum, New York, p. 333. 
25 Caldwell, Lynton (1984 ). "Political Aspects of Ecologically Sustainable 
Development, Environmental Conservation, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 299-308. 
26 IUCN (1990). World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation 
for Sustainable Development, Gland, Switzerland: International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, United Nations Environment 
Program and World Wildlife Fund). 
significance and the catch phrase it has become today. Since 
1987, all manner of political leaders have talked about SD, and 
reams of paper have been published on the subject. SD as a 
concept has become devalued to the point where, to some, it 1s 
now just a cliche. 
16 
The manner in which the phrase SD is used and interpreted 
varies so much that while O'Riordan called SD a "contradiction m 
terms,"27 Redclift suggested that it may be just "another 
development truism."28 These interpretational problems, though 
ultimately conceptual, have some semantic roots. Most people 
use the phrase "sustainable development" interchangeably with 
"ecologically sustainable or environmentally sound 
development. "29 In this interpretation, SD is understood as 
"ecological sustainability," and is conceptualized as a process of 
change that has (ecological) sustainability among its objectives. 
Another problem in the literature occurs between what SD 
fundamentally involves and what is desirable in the pursuit of it. 
For example, participation in decision-making is held by some to 
be important in achieving SD. Yet democracy is hardly the most 
efficient -- albeit in the long run arguably the most equitable --
mechanism for allocating scarce resources. Some suggest that this 
27 O'Riordan, Timothy. (1985). "Future Directions in Environmental 
Policy," Journal of Environment and Planning, vol. 17 pp. 1431-1446. 
28Redclift, Michael (1987). op. cit., p. 7. 
29 Tolba, Mostafa (1987). op. cit., p. 64. 
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politically expedient fuzziness will have to be overcome in favor 
of intellectual clarity and rigor, if the concept of SD is to be of 
fundamental importance.3 O 
However, such critiques miss a major point. The basic 
implication of the concept of SD, as embraced by the Brundtland 
Commission and others, is that we should leave to the next 
generation a stock of "quality of life" assets no less than those we 
have inherited.31 It is a political goal. But this can be interpreted 
in three ways: 
• that the next generation should inherit such a stock of wealth 
comprising human-made assets and environmental assets; 
• or that the next generation should inherit a stock of 
environmental assets no less than that inherited by the 
previous generation; 
• or that the inherited stock should comprise human-made 
assets, natural assets and "human capital." 
The first interpretation stresses all capital assets, human-made 
and "natural." The second emphasizes "natural capital" only. The 
third includes cultural and other human inheritances. Throughout 
recent history, human development has followed the pattern of 
the first interpretation. But as the human stresses of ecological 
functions are straining them to their breaking-point, so the 
30 Lele, Sharachchandra (1991). "Sustainable Development: a Critical 
Review," World Development, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 607-621. 
31 Pearce, David, Markandya, Anil and Barbier, Edward (1989). Blueprint 
for a Green Economy, Earthscan, New York, p. 47. 
l 8 
concept of "stock" should mature. Furthermore, the condition of 
"human capital" -- that is, society and its cultural inheritance -- 1s 
also at risk and must be built into any desirable concept of 
development. The powerful intuitive idea underlying the concept 
is that of intergenerational equity: our development is 
sustainable only to the extent that we can meet our needs without 
prejudice to those of future generations. This is similar in its 
intuitive appeal, although perhaps less emotionally charged, to 
concepts such as "freedom" and "justice." Even in those places 
where there is broad general agreement about what such terms 
mean, the actual achievement of human freedom, justice, and SD 
will be specific to local conditions and possibilities.3 2 
In any event, the practice of development that can be called 
sustainable on any basis is far behind the rhetoric. There is not 
enough empirical evidence or experience on which to base a solid 
definition. The meaning is itself evolving. SD is the intuitively 
sold "handrail that guides us along as we proceed toward 
development. "33 However, Edward Barbier sought to provide an 
analytical framework.34 It starts from the premise that 
development intrinsically involves trade-offs between conflicting 
3 2 Holmberg, Johan, Bass, Stephen and Timberlake, Lloyd (1991 ). 
Defending the Future - a Guide to Sustainable Development, Earthscan, New 
York, p. 11. 
33 Lele, S. (1991). op. cit., p.610. 
34 Barbier, Edward (1987). "The concept of sustainable economic 
development," Environmental Conservation, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 101-110. 
19 
goals, such as between economic growth and environmental 
conservation, introducing modern technology and preserving 
traditional culture, or reconciling growth with improved social 
equity. Given that many of the qualitative dimensions of the 
trade-offs cannot be accurately measured, the process inevitably 
becomes subject to judgment based on prevailing values and 
ethical norms. The process is dynamic with regard to space and 
time, and the trade-offs will differ between locations and time 
scales. 
Barbier identified three systems as basic to any process of 
development: the biological or ecological resource system, the 
economic system and the social system. Human society applies a 
set of goals to each system, each with its own hierarchy of sub-
goals and targets. The objective of SD will then be to maximize 
goal achievement across these three systems at one and the same 
time through an adaptive process of trade-offs. It will not be 
possible to maximize all goals all the time, and there may be 
conflict among intra-system goals. Choices must therefore be 
made as to which goals should receive greater priority. Different 
development strategies will assign different priorities. 
System goals could include the following: 
Biological system goals 
• Genetic diversity. 
• Resilience. 
• Biological productivity. 
20 
Economic system goals 
• Increasing production of goods and services. 
• Satisfying basic needs or reducing poverty. 
• Improving equity. 
Social system goals 
• Cultural diversity. 
• Social justice. 
• Gender equality. 
• Participation.35 
Given the need for trade-offs between (and within) systems 
in interest of the greater whole, disciplined and consistent choices 
must be made as to which goals should receive priority in the 
development strategy. But the process of trade-offs among goals 
must be adaptive, for as individual preferences, social norms, 
ecological conditions, and so on, change over time, so must the 
relative priorities or weights assigned to various goals. Early on m 
the development process, conservation of the environment will 
mean protecting the natural resource base on which the economy 
depends, and this will require one set of policies and actions. 
Later on, the priorities for environment conservation will be 
different because more emphasis will be placed on minimizing the 
detriment of the industrialized society, again with different 
policies and actions. 3 6 
3 5 The source for the system goals is ibid. 
36 Tisdell, Clem (1988). "Sustainable Development: Differing Perspectives 
of Ecologists and Economists, and Relevance to LDCs," World Development, 
vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 377-384. 
21 
The term SD, as posited by Barbier and others, suggests that 
the lessons of ecology can, and should, be applied to economic 
processes. It encompasses the ideas of the WCED, providing an 
environmental rationale through which the claims of development 
to improve the quality of life can be challenged and tested. To 
what extent, though, does SD provide an alternative paradigm, or 
system of meaning, as well as a focus for improving 
environmental policy and management? 
In describing what he calls "co-evolutionary" development, 
Norgaard outlines possible linkages between economic and 
ecological paradigms.37 His intention is not to construct a new 
paradigm out of what remains of existing models, but to draw 
attention to the advantages of using different models 
simultaneously: 
A linkage is quite different from a grand synthesis of 
previously incongruous paradigms. Through a linkage, 
each discipline enriches the other because of their 
differences. Neither discipline must abandon its past. 
Eventually, however, new emphases and approaches 
arise because of the enrichment...3 8 
Norgaard calls his co-evolutionary approach a perspective, rather 
than a paradigm. This perspective takes issue with the way in 
which economics tackles environmental processes, attributing the 
37 Norgaard, Richard (1989). "Sustainable development: A coevolutionary 
view," Futures , vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 606-620. See also, Norgaard, Richard 
( 1984 ). "Coevolutionary agricultural development," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 343-366. 
38 Ibid., p. 355. 
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short-sightedness of many economists to their attachment to a 
mechanistic view of science. The implications of Norgaard's 
perspective are much more radical than the injunction to consider 
different disciplinary perspectives originally suggests. 
SD requires a broad view of both economics and ecology, 
together with a political commitment to ensure that development 
is sustainable. The practical implications of such a position are 
important and cannot easily be avoided. Is it possible to 
undertake environmental planning and management in a way that 
does minimum damage to ecological processes without putting a 
brake on human aspirations for economic and social 
improvement? Does SD have a formal methodology? These 
questions await discussion in a later chapter. For the moment it 
remains to discuss the ways in which the SD approach accounts for 
the underlying inequalities that limit the livelihood opportunities 
of poor people and their environments. 
One approach is that put forward by Farvar and Glaeser.3 9 
They see SD as essentially political. The objective is not merely to 
identify the limitations of existing approaches; it is to advocate 
alternatives that deal effectively with "the power variable": 
Naive statements on needs, participation and 
environmental compatibility are espoused in many 
papers ... But whose needs are going to be met and 
whose are not; who will participate and who will not; 
and which lobbies, interest groups, and economic and 
39 Farvar, M.T. and Glaeser, B. (1979). Politics of Ecodevelopment, 
Earthscan, New York, p. 141. 
political entities will be hurt by environmental 
compatibility?40 
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Taking a long look at the practical commitment of international 
organizations to SD objectives, Farvar and Glaeser conclude that, 
even when fundamental approaches like land reform and 
restructuring of the relations of production have been considered 
in the agenda of such organizations, "the real issues have been 
obscured and neutralized by sterile language and wrong 
premises." 41 They attribute this ineffectiveness to a number of 
factors, among them budgetary cuts (for example, the budget of 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was halved 
between 1975 and 1979), and to the antipathy of various Western 
countries to any program based on self-reliance and the reduction 
of the South's technological dependence on the North. Clearly, 
advocating SD in principle does not commit governments or 
international organizations to its achievement in practice. 
SD is also a term given to the planning concept advocated by 
UNEP. It was defined as "development at regional and local 
levels ... consistent with the potentials of the area involved, with 
attention given to the adequate and rational use of the natural 
resources, and to applications of technological styles. 42" This 
40 Ibid., p.1. 
41 Ibid., p.6. 
42 UNEP (1984). General Assessment of Progress in the Implementation of 
the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification, UNEP, New York, p. 6. 
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usage suggests a regional focus for resource planning, informed by 
technological considerations. It is a long way from the ethically 
committed, integrated approach suggested by Jacobs and 
Munroe.43 
Dasmann also departs from UNEP's planning approach by 
advocating a definition of SD that is little short of moral renewal 
and self-sufficiency: "to somewhat simplify sustainable 
development, I have considered it to be represented by a triangle, 
one side of which is basic needs, the second self-reliance, and the 
\ base ecological sustainability. "44 Each of these variables needs to 
be considered, since development will not be sustainable unless 
poor people are involved in meeting their aspirations. As 
Chambers has expressed it, what is required is that "last" thinking 
is adopted, putting people first and poor people and their 
priorities first of all. "The environment and development are 
means, not ends in themselves. The environment and 
development are for people, not people for environment and 
43 Jacobs, P. and Munroe, D. ,eds., (1987). Conservation with Equity: 
Strategies for Sustainable Development, proceedings of the Conference on 
Conservation and Development: Implementing the World Conservation 
Strategy, Ottawa, Canada, May 31-June 5, 1986, IUCN, Gland, Swizerland. 
"Sustainable Development seeks ... to respond to five broad requirements: 
(1) integration of conservation and development, (2) satisfaction of basic 
human needs, (3) achievement of equity and social justice, (4) provision of 
social self-determination and cultural diversity, and (5) maintenance of 
ecological integrity." p. 6 
44 Dasmann, R.F. (1985). Achieving the Sustainable Use of Species and 
Ecosystems, Wiley, London, p. 215. 
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In Chambers' terminology SD is a "first" concept, 
since it was first conceived. In his view the poor are largely 
concerned with their immediate livelihoods; it is the enlightened 
rich who give priority to sustainability. What is required is a 
mental leap along the lines of "sustainable livelihood thinking."46 
He contrasts "environment thinking" with "development thinking" 
and "livelihood thinking." The perspective of the poor is at 
variance with that of most economists and biologists, placing the 
immediate satisfaction of needs and the avoidance of risk before 
sustainability or higher productivity. Similarly the time horizon 
of the poor is shorter, the future valued much less than the 
present. According to Chambers, "sustainable livelihood thinking" 
enables causal connections to be made between development and 
livelihoods and between the environment and livelihoods. What 
poor people pursue through the development process and their 
use of the environment is, simply put, a better livelihood. 
The perspective advocated by Chambers is a real advance on 
much of the "institutional" writing about SD. The concept has both 
economic and ecological parameters which are difficult to marry. 
Dissatisfaction with the narrowness of the ecological model has led 
to attempts to steal or borrow some sociological content, either 
through social planning norms (UNEP's use) or through referring 
45 Chambers, Robert (1986). Sustainable Livelihoods: An Opportunity for 
the World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford University 
Press, New York, p. 7. 
46 Ibid., p.10. 
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to "basic needs" and "self reliance." Chambers criticizes the 
suggestion that we are in a better position than the poor to 
recognize what is good for them, an assumption contained in much 
of the "basic needs" writing.47 He asserts that "short-term 
improvements in living create conditions for later livelihood-
intensive human use of the environment which is sustainable. "4 8 
Human welfare should be the point of departure. 
The nagging doubt remains, however, that despite the 
seriousness of Chambers' position, it does not represent an 
adequate response to the issue raised by Farvar and Glaeser. For 
SD to become a reality it is necessary for the livelihoods of the 
poor to be given priority, but how can this priority be pursued at 
the local level while the effects of international development 
systematically marginalizes them? The political aspects of 
development extend to SD options which can only be achieved 
through political changes at the local, national, and international 
level. Chambers believes that "political economy" can be 
incorporated in his approach by examining the net effect of 
4 7 For a description of the "basic needs" approach, see List Franklin, 
"Conventional development strategies and basic needs fulfillment," 
reprinted as Reading 5 in Todaro, Michael ed. (1983).The Struggle for 
Economic Development, Longman, New York; and P.K. Ghosh, ed. (1984). 
Third World Development: A Basic Needs Approach, Greenwood Press, 
Westport, Conn. For an attempt to specify and quantify the concept of basic 
needs, see ILO, Employment, Growth and Basic Needs, International Labor 
Organization, Geneva. A similar view with a focus on the notion of 
"entitlements" can be found in Sen, Amartya (1983). "Development: Which 
way now?" The Economic Journal vol. 93 December, pp. 754-757. 
48 Ibid., p.13. 
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transnational corporations and logging contractors on sustainable 
livelihoods. However, these interests are often determining 
factors in the availability, or otherwise, of sustainable livelihoods. 
It is necessary to put political economy first when applying real-
world thinking to the priorities of the poor. As will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, unless the mainstream 
conception of SD is pitched at a level which recognizes 
international structures, it is in danger of being yet another 
discarded development concept, like "appropriate technology." Its 
polemical usefulness will have outlived its practical utility. 
CHAPTER 3. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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Documents advocating SD, such as the World Conservation 
Strategy and WCED, fail to come to grips with the central issue of 
economic growth as the motor behind development. 49 The 
previous discussion of SD was principally addressed to the 
negative consequences of development. This chapter will cover 
the problem of economic growth and the environment specifically 
in societies of the South. The analysis is directed towards 
identifying those features of the international economy -- trade, 
aid policy, the debt crisis and the behavior of multinational 
corporations -- that carry negative implications for the long-term 
sustainability of the development process. 
Economic growth and world trade 
Most development economists and international 
agencies take the view that without fairly free international 
trade it is extremely difficult to see how all but the largest 
developing countries will be able to get sustained economic 
growth under way, as previously discussed. The classical 
case is that the "gains from trade" outweigh the losses. 
However, this approach to trade and development fails to 
address some serious issues. First, even the textbooks on 
49 WCED (1987); Jacobs, P. and Munroe, D. ,eds., (1987). 
international-trade theory acknowledge that the gains may 
be very unevenly divided as between countries or trading 
blocs, depending on their relative economic "muscle" and 
their disposition to employ this power. 
Second, Classical theory also acknowledges that there 
will be losers as well as gainers. However it does not 
identify a process at work which will "equalize" these 
advantages/disadvantages to individual countries. 
Third, Orthodox definitions of development imply that 
economic growth is broadly beneficial and that freer trade 
will stimulate growth. However, the assertion that economic 
growth is beneficial for whole societies can be questioned. 
Similarly, without calculating the environmental and social 
consequences of growth, it may be a mistake to pursue 
growth rather than "development" in a wider sense. 
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The concentration on growth has obscured the fact that 
resource depletion and other aspe.cts of unsustainable 
development are direct consequences of growth itself. Where 
agencies like the World Bank have made loans to promote high-
growth sectors, the environmental and social consequence have 
often been disastrous. For example, as discussed later in this 
chapter, the effects of ranching in the humid tropics have usually 
proved negative in both social and environmental terms. The 
returns on capital represented by investment in ranching obscure 
the progressive squandering of a unique global asset--tropical 
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ecosystems and the people who live in harmony with them, which 
are frequently excluded from the calculation. Conventional 
economic development identifies the optimal conditions for 
exploiting resources, a rather different process from considering 
sustainable development. The different dimensions of 
sustainability - social, environmental and ethical - are an essential 
part of the development debate, but ones which the concern with 
"growth" often leads one to miss. 
If the existence of international trade in the modern world 
is essential to economic growth in less developed countries, it has 
also ensured that natural resources are exploited for short-term 
profit. Deteriorating terms of trade for poor countries have 
contributed to the clearing of rain forests to make way for export-
led stock-raising. Similarly, a poor balance-of-payments position 
is likely to contribute to a country's over-dependence on 
fuelwood, especially given the high costs of petroleum-based 
energy .50 Alternatively, a fall in price, in relative terms, for key 
commodity crops usually increases the use of land for these rather 
than for food crops, and this in turn increases food imports into 
countries that could be self-sufficient. The point is that decisions 
over the use to which natural resources are put are clearly 
influenced, directly and indirectly, by the trading patterns 
established by the developed countries. Environmental problems 
are not reducible to international economic relations, but they 
50 Smith, N. (1984). Op. Cit., p. 20. 
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would not have assumed their present gravity if the developing 
countries had been able to practice the sustainable-resource 
methods which often formed part of their traditional systems.5 1 
It is within this context, in which sustainable practices have 
been neglected in favor of closer economic dependence on 
Northern technology and markets, that one needs to understand 
the current environmental crisis. For example, advising African 
countries on how to develop their resources has become a major 
industry, with European and North American consulting firms 
charging as much as $180,000 for a year of the professional 
expert's time. In 1985 more than half the $7-8 billion spent 
yearly by development donors in Africa went to finance the 
80,000 expatriates working for public agencies under official aid 
programs.52 It may reasonably be asked who is providing 
development assistance to whom under these circumstances. 
Awareness of the serious nature of Africa's environmental 
crisis has done little to alter the approach of international 
development agencies. The World Bank's 1881 "Berg Report" on 
Africa advocates export-led development as a development 
priority, rather than goals such as self-sufficiency in food.53 The 
51 Barbier, Edward (1989). "Sustainable Agriculture on Marginal Land: a 
Policy Framework," Environment, vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 13-17, 36-40. 
5 2 Timberlake, Lloyd (1985). Africa in Crisis, Earthscan, London, p. 8. 
53 Lewis, Stephen, Jr. (1986) "Africa's Trade and the World Economy," in 
Robert Berg, and J. Seymour Whitaker (eds.) (1986). Strategies for African 
Development, University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 490. 
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solution to Africa's growing external debts, debts like those which 
have already made a deep impact in Latin America, is held to be 
the "East-Asian model" of export-led performance: Taiwan, South 
Korea, Hong Kong. The Berg Report recommended cutting 
government subsidies and privatizing the public sector of most 
African countries with debt problems as a solution to African 
insolvency. Interestingly, the emphasis in explaining these 
problems was placed squarely on "environmental" causes and 
population increase rather than on externally induced structural 
problems.54 
Export-led development, however, is a perilous, if not 
impossible, route for most African countries at a time of economic 
uncertainty in the North and worsening international terms of 
trade for the South. Africa is likely to experience what Latin 
America already knows: that private banks can only get 
repayments on their loans if they lend more money to the debtor. 
The alternative of a debt moratorium is still considered by most 
countries a much greater risk than defaulting. Most African 
countries are agreed that food sufficiency should be their 
continental goal, but they are almost powerless to . achieve it while 
they are saddled with the need to increase export income. How, 
they ask, can we export more to the developed countries, as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
recommend, when the developed countries are trying to restrict 
54 Ibid., pp. 488-489. 
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their imports? Faced with the need for "structural adjustment", 
they ask the question put by Susan George: 
If the International Monetary Fund believed (which it 
patently does not) that economic growth can also 
result from greater social equality, access to education, 
health-care and other basic services, fairer income 
distribution etc., it could make such objectives part of 
its programs.5 5 
These agencies see their primary role as that of 
guaranteeing the maintenance of the trade process which 
contributed to the developing countries' indebtedness in the first 
place.56 Granted there is some change from within these 
organizations over the last few years. The capacity of the South to 
mount long-term sustainability is a problem both for the less 
developed countries which are most "developed" (the bigger 
countries in Latin America, and some in East Asia) and those 
which are least developed (the Sahelian countries, Bangladesh, 
Haiti). For the first group of semi-industrialized countries, rapid 
economic growth has meant that they have inherited many of the 
environmental problems of the "rich world" in an exaggerated 
form. For the second group declining per capita incomes and 
resource exhaustion have led to mass migration, the resettlement 
55 George, Susan (1985). The Debt Crisis, The Other Economic Summit, 
London, p.3. 
56 Rich, Bruce (1994). Mortgaging the earth: The World Bank, 
environmental impoverishment, and the crisis of development, Beacon 
Press, Boston, pp. 182-200. 
34 
of populations, increasing population pressures and frequently 
financial bankruptcy. In both cases the form of their insertion 
within the international economy has reduced their capacity to 
solve their own environmental problems. 
There is significant evidence that the world market is an 
enemy to Third World Countries. Almost all Third World 
countries are dependent on exporting minerals and cash crops. 
While real prices in the world market for these commodities have 
declined during the post-World War II period, the prices of 
manufactured imports from industrialized countries have steadily 
increased.5 7 
Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, low commodity prices have 
affected markets and local communities that depend on a very 
narrow range of exports. Most Third World countries find 
themselves in what Oxfam calls a "trade trap" where they are 
forced to produce cash crops for income that is so low, they 
continue to live their lives in abject poverty .5 8 
In Cote d' Ivoire, exports of coffee rose by 26 percent in 
volume but fell by 21 percent in value between 1988 and 1990.59 
Similarly, in Rwanda, export earnings declined by 50 percent 
5 7 Coote, Belinda (1992). The Trade Trap: Poverty and the Global Commodity 
Markets, Oxfam, Oxford, p.8. 
5 8 Ibid., ix. 
59 UNICEF (1993). The Progress of Nations, UNICEF, New York, pp. 50-51. 
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between 1987 and 1991.60 A recent study demonstrates that 
under the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), Africa will economically suffer under the new 
agreement. With the loss of special trading rights with the 
European Community (EC) and cuts in agricultural subsidies, it is 
estimated that Africa will lose an additional $3 billion in trade 
income each year. 6 1 
The deterioration of Africa's terms of trade means that most 
African governments have been forced to spend more in the 
world market than they earn. They have filled this gap by 
borrowing. By 1992, external debt for sub- Saharan Africa was 
over $200 billion, a debilitating number that represents 109 
percent of its GNP, an 80 percent increase since 1980.62 The 
World Bank has concluded that "the bite that debt-service 
payments take out of a country's capacity to import each year 1s 
clearly unsustainable in an environment of low investment and 
stagnant GDP. "63 
Forced to produce foreign-exchange earning crops to pay off 
unpayable debts, African nations find themselves importing more 
60 Ibid., p. 52. 
61 Ritchie, Mark, (1994) "GATT Facts: Africa Loses Under GATT", Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy, March 1994. pp. 45-58. 
62 World Bank (1993). Social Indicators of Development 1993, The Johns 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore MA, p. 29. 
63 Ibid. 
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and more food. Food imports, currently estimated at 10 percent of 
total imports, place considerable strain on Africa's balance of 
payments. 64 
The combined effect of the World Bank, the IMF and United 
States government borrowing has been to maintain high interest 
rates, to increase pressure on Third World countries to export 
more and consume less, and to starve much of the developing 
world of much needed capital. The costs of United States 
government debt policy are particularly painful in countries like 
those of sub-Saharan Africa, where more than 60 per cent of 
export earnings come from commodities for which the pnce 
elasticity of demand is such that an increase in export volume 
(urged by the IMF and the Berg Report) would actually reduce 
export earnings.65 Without altering fundamentally both the way 
the debt is managed, and the policies of the industrial countries 
towards trade and investment in the South, export-led solutions 
threaten to put at risk many of the achievements of post-colonial 
admini strati on. 
The solution to these problems is not global economic 
growth, in the language of the Brandt Report, for the struggle to 
effect such growth might in itself be damaging to the poor who 
are already paying the price for structural "adjustment." The 
64 UNDP (1994). Human Development Report 1994 Oxford University Press, 
New York, p. 55. 
65 Godfrey, M, (1986) in T. Rose (ed.) Crisis and Recovery in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, OECD, Paris, p. 178. 
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pursuit of economic growth, unchecked by environmental 
considerations, can accelerate, among other things, topsoil losses, 
the scarcity of fresh water, and the deterioration of grassland and 
deforestation. These apparently inexorable processes are a 
consequence of policies long advocated for Africa and Latin 
America: increase exports, buy in expertise from foreign 
consultants, construct big dams, bring more land under export-
crop production. The irony is that these policies not only have 
negative environmental consequences, they also frequently fail to 
meet their economic objectives.66 The unsustainable utilization of 
resources for short-term "growth" objectives might ultimately fail 
to bring about economic growth itself. 
Finally, it is sometimes argued that population pressure is 
the major obstacle to securing development in the South, as if 
limiting population could be divorced from the strategies poor 
people adopt in pursuing their livelihoods. Reference is made to 
how increasing family size will prevent human needs being met, 
when large families are precisely one of the strategies open to the 
poor to ensure their own survival. What needs to be recognized is 
the major influence of socio-economic conditions, the vulnerability 
as well as the absolute poverty of people, on the number of 
children in the family. The benefit children provide to parents m 
most third world countries cannot be measured just by hours of 
66 Repetto, Robert (1990). "Environmental Productivity," Challenge, vol. 
33, no. 5, Sept-Oct , pp. 33-48. 
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labor and/or income for the family. The intangibles are just as 
important. Bigger families carry more weight in community 
affairs. In the third world, with no reliable channels for 
advancement in sight, parents can always hope that the next child 
will be the one clever and bright enough to get an education and 
land a city job despite the odds. 
Consider the implications of the following World Bank 
population statistics covering three-fourths of the world's people 
who live in 72 countries that the bank designates low and lower-
middle income.67 
While average annual population growth rates in all 
industrial countries have been below 2 percent a year for 
decades, in these 72 countries only six had reduced their 
population growth below 2 percent by 1982. 68 Of these, only four 
have experienced a dramatic drop in their growth rate since the 
1960s: China, Sri Lanka, Cuba, and Colombia. (Although not a 
country, and therefore not listed in the World Bank statistics, the 
Indian state of Kerala also reduced it population growth rate 
67 World Bank (1984). The World Development Report 1984, Oxford 
University Press, New York, table 19. 
68 Technically Lebanon should be added to this group of six; its growth rate 
fell from 2.9 percent to .5 percent between 1960-1982. The extreme 
disruption of the country no doubt is a major contributor and limits the 
usefulness of including it in any general discussion of population 
successes. Also note that the World Bank does not include several island 
countries like Grenada and Mauritius that also have growth rates below 2 
percent. 
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below 2 percent.69) Population growth in these four exceptional 
countries and in Kerala has slowed at twice the rate of the current 
industrialized countries during their transition from high to low 
growth. 70 What do these exceptions tell us? What could societies 
as different as those of China, Sri Lanka, Cuba, Colombia, and 
Kerala have in common? Except Colombia, they have all assured 
their citizens access to a basic diet through more extensive food 
guarantee systems than exist in other third world societies. 
In most of these societies, income distribution is also less 
skewed than in most other countries. The distribution of 
household income in Sri Lanka, for example, is more equitable 
than in Indonesia, India, or even the United States. 71 
The positive link between fertility decline and increased 
income equity is confirmed by empirical investigations. While one 
might question the possibility of such neat precision, one World 
Bank study of 64 different countries indicated that when the 
poorest group's income goes up by one percentage point, the 
general fertility rate drops by almost three percentage points. 7 2 
69 Census of India, Kerala State , Part2A, Statement 3 and 8, pp. 28 and 32. As 
quoted in Lappe, F.M. and Schurman, Rachel ( 1990) Taking Population 
Seriously, Grove Press, San Francisco, pp. 120-1. According to the Indian 
Census, the population growth rate of Kerala averaged 1. 8 percent annually 
between 1971 and 1981. 
70 Murdoch, William (1980). The Poverty of Nations, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, p. 89. 
71 World Bank (1984). The World Development Report 1984, Oxford 
University Press, New York, table 28. 
72 World Bank (1974). Population Policies and Economic Development, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Appendix A, p. 147. The study 
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When literacy and life expectancy are added to the income 
analysis, the three factors explain 80 percent of the variation in 
fertility amount countries. 7 3 
The conventional argument about population growth could 
be reversed: efforts to slow down population growth will continue 
to be frustrated until meeting basic human needs is considered 
the priority of development. 
Aid and the monetization of local economies 
Few international issues have focused as much attention as 
aid, but, often the discussion of development aid is divorced from 
a consideration of long-term environmental effects. Apologists for 
aid, especially food aid, have powerful ideological support in 
popular assumptions which link helping people in the Third World 
with general "neighborliness." 
There are many popular misconceptions about aid. Aid, 
especially bilateral aid between countries, is not directed simply 
to alleviating hunger and poverty. Even if it has a net effect 
which is advantageous to the poor, for whom much of it was 
intended, it is often more beneficial to the better-off in Third 
World countries.74 By reducing peoples' capacity to manage their 
also controlled for per capita GNP differences. The poorest groups here 
refers to the bottom 40 percent of the population by income. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ruchelshaus, William (1989). "Toward a Sustainable World," Scientific 
American, vol. 261, no. 3, Sept. pp. 166-174. For more global effects of U.S. 
foreign aid see Lappe F.M., Collins, Joseph, and Kinley, David (1981), Aid As 
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own environment on a sustainable productive basis, aid may 
contribute to the problem it was intended to address. Food aid, in 
particular, can increase food dependency and remove 
responsibility for the environment from those who have most to 
gain from its beneficial long-term management. This was 
succinctly expressed by a Senegalese farmer in the following way: 
We don't want to be called bush people. We are 
citizens like everyone else. We want to be free to sell 
to whom we choose, and to buy from whom we choose. 
We too want to set our own prices. No one ought to 
make us concentrate on cotton: we should grow what 
we think is best for us. They tell us to follow their 
programs and we'll get their assistance, and when we 
follow that program the prices of their ploughs double 
and the prices for our crops stay the same. 7 5 
Most donor countries, in a position to give aid, give it to 
countries with which they are politically sympathetic. Egypt, 
Israel and Turkey between them receive four-fifths of all United 
States bilateral aid, in 1990. A few countries receive a significant 
amount of United States bilateral aid without much military 
assistance (India, Indonesia and Bangladesh among them), but 
even this combined total adds up to no more than the United 
States gives Egypt in military spending, and not much more than 
Obstacle: Twenty Questions about our Foreign Aid and the Hungry. Grove 
Press, San Francisco; and Lappe, F.M., Schurman, Rachel, and Danaher, 
Kevin (1987). Betraying the National Interest, Grove Press, San Francisco 
75 Rose, S., R. Lewontin, and L. Kamin (1984). Not in Our Genes: Biology, 
Ideology and Human Nature, Penguin, New York, p. 16. 
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half what it gives to Israel.76 Aid does not simply have political 
strings: it is clearly important as part of global political strategies. 
It is clear that aid is not given to those who need it most, but to 
those whom the aid-givers choose for political and strategic 
reasons, rather than the eradication of poverty. 
Aid also distinguishes unfairly between those who receive it. 
For example, in 1983 Ethiopia had the lowest annual per capita 
income in Africa (only $140) but received a mere $8 per capita in 
aid. Neighboring Somalia, where incomes per head was twice as 
high, received for its friendship with the West about ten times as 
much aid per capita in 1984. There is evidence too that cash 
handouts tend to reach those farmers who are well connected, 
rather than those in greatest need, reinforcing public skepticism 
m developed countries, when it is exposed. 7 7 
Within Third World countries aid is rarely concentrated on 
the services that benefit the poorest. The World Bank reckons 
that, of all the aid going to low-income countries in 1988, a mere 2 
percent went to primary health care and 1 percent to population 
programs.78 Even the aid that is spent on health and education 
7 6 Patten, Christopher ( 1990). "Common Future- Common Challenge: Aid 
Policy and the Environment," in D.R. Angell, J.D. Comer, and M.L. 
Wilkinson (eds.) Sustaining Earth: Response to the Environmental Threat, 
St. Martin's Press, New York, pp. 135-152; see also, The Economist , "A 
Survey of Third World Finance: New Ways to Grow," Sept 25, 1993, pp. 
Survey 1-43. 
77 Ibid. p. 137. 
78 The Economist , "What's wrong with foreign aid?" May 7, 1994, pp. 19-22. 
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tends to go to services that benefit disproportionately the better-
off. Aid for health care goes disproportionately to hospitals (in 
1988-89, for instance, 33 percent of Japan's bilateral aid for 
health went to building hospitals); aid for education, to 
universities. In sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s, only $1 of 
official development assistance went on each primary pupil; $11 
on each secondary pupil, and $575 on each university student.7 9 
Food aid, like much aid in general, helps strengthen the 
position of urban workers and urban elites at the expense of rural 
groups.80 By making cheap imported food available it also acts as 
a disincentive to local farmers to produce. Where they can, they 
avail themselves of food aid. It also, and this is a critical issue, 
changes the diet of the poor, introducing them to highly valued 
imports like wheat bread, at the expense of indigenous food grains 
and root crops, millet, sorghum and cassava. The shift in tastes 
reduces demand for the local farmers' produce which in turn 
holds down the prices local farmers receive. The neglect of basic 
agricultural research into the crops grown by small farmers, one 
of the abiding weaknesses of African development policy, 
completes the vicious circle of poverty. 8 I 
79 World Bank, (1992). Effective implementation: Key to Development 
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80 Lipton, Michael (1977). Why Poor People Stay Poor, Temple Smith, 
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81 Hayter, T. and C. Watson (1989). Aid: Rhetoric and Reality, Pluto, London, 
p. 31. 
-----, 
44 
The Green Revolution in Asia was a dramatic example of the 
way that the production of food programs could be increased 
through improved seed varieties and heavy dependence on 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. The increases in aggregate 
production which followed enabled some countries, like India, to 
build up national buffer stocks of food staples, ensuring that they 
would not experience shortfalls like those of 1971, when over one 
million died because food was not available. However, the 
ecological effects of this Revolution are being counted today, two 
decades after it got under way. They include the salinization of 
irrigation water, the polluting effects of chemical sprays, and the 
increasing resistance of pest species to insecticides. The total 
environmental cost is even greater, and account should be taken 
of the narrowing of popular diets, the increased vulnerability of 
small farmers to indebtedness, and the external dependence of 
oil-importing countries (like India) on outside suppliers. The 
Green Revolution has proved to be a mixed blessing. 8 2 
Most of the technical assistance that has gone into African 
and Latin American agriculture has been directed at producing 
cash crops for the international market. The Green Revolution has 
mixed effects, but it was at least targeted at food crops. Cash crops 
earn foreign exchange to pay for capital goods, intermediate 
goods, and oil. Increasingly cash crops pay off the interest on the 
82 Johnston, B.F. and W.C. Clark (1982). Redesigning Rural Development: A 
Strategic Perspective, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 10-
23. 
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external debt that was itself incurred largely through the 
acquisition of prestigious and capital-intensive development 
infrastructure. This is another vicious circle, made up not of the 
producers and consumers of food, but of the producers and 
consumers of transnational technology. The contrasts between 
Latin America and Africa and many parts of Asia are vivid. 
Inevitably, Africa has become a food-dependent continent as a 
result. Cereal imports rose to 32 million tons in 1984, when 
African farmers themselves were able to produce less than two-
thirds of the continent's cereal needs. According to the Food and 
Agricultural Organization, Africa will be growing just over one half 
of its own cereal needs by the year 2000. 8 3 
Cash crops have also contributed to the monetization of local 
economies. By "local economies" is meant the system of production 
and distribution that local people manage themselves. Within local 
economies the labor of women, in particular, is as undervalued in 
financial terms as it is essential in livelihood terms. The impact of 
market forces women's labor is taken for granted, and the labor 
process is transformed, to the benefit of men. Women's 
responsibility for reproduction as well as production places them 
in a disadvantageous position in relation to new market 
opportunities. It is women who nurture the children, feed the 
family and provide much of the "casual" paid labor which 
8 3 As quoted in Timberlake, Lloyd ( 1985). Africa in Crisis: The Causes, The 
Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy, Earthscan, New York, pp. 51-68. 
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underpins commodity production for the market. It is also women, 
critically, who interact most closely with the natural environment: 
collecting the fuelwood, carrying the household's water long 
distances, tending the vegetable garden. Women therefore bear 
the brunt of environmental degradation, through their proximity 
to and dependence upon the environment, while also being held 
responsible for this decline. Unable to reverse the erosion of 
resources to which the household has access, women are placed m 
the impossible position of acting as guardians of an environment 
which is as undervalued and exploited as their own labor. 8 4 
The effects of an increase in commodity production for the 
market and the family's dependence on wage labor fall 
disproportionately on women and, through them, the 
environment. Male involvement in the monetized sector is 
invariably greater than that of women across a range of rural 
societies. Similarly, women bear major responsibility for intensive 
non-mechanized production at one end of the food system, the 
end which is casually ignored by large-scale development 
projects. At the "other" end of the food system it is usually women 
who look after food-processing, storage and family nutrition, 
activities that are increasingly displaced from the household by 
the "development" process and relocated in commercial, agro-
industrial plants controlled by men. It is essential to recognize 
84 Ekins, Paul (1992). op. cit.; see also, Sebstad, Jennifer (1990). Women and 
Self-reliance in India: The SEWA Story, Zed, London. 
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that the loss of primary environmental control by rural 
households is bound up with the marginal status and declining 
economic power of women.85 
What are the specifically environmental effects of 
development aid? Can one make connections between the 
economic and social costs of large-scale development planning and 
the disintegration of the rural environment in so much of the 
South? The answer is that one can but that the connections are 
often obscured by the superficial attraction of large projects. As 
Bruce Rich reports: 
Projects involving the spraying of vast areas with 
massive amounts of hard pesticides that are often 
banned in Western countries, projects involving the 
construction of big hydropower and perennial 
irrigation schemes which require the removal of large 
populations on to infertile land, with no proper 
compensation, and which must inevitably lead to 
widespread waterlogging and soil salinization as well 
as the spread of waterborne diseases.8 6 
In 1988 the four Multilateral Development Banks (World Bank, 
Inter American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and 
African Development Bank) allocated over half their project loans 
to work in environmentally sensitive areas, such as agriculture, 
rural development, dam and irrigation schemes. But they 
85 Momsen, J.H. (1991). Women and development in the third world, 
Routledge, London, pp. 6-15. 
86 Rich, Bruce (1985). "Multilateral Development Banks-Their Role in 
Destroying the Global Environment," The Ecologist, vol. 15, no. 2, p. 56. 
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employed an absurdly small staff to oversee the "environmental 
consequences" of their work. The Office of Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs of the World Bank employs a "minuscule" staff to 
review the prospective environmental impacts of most of the 
Bank's 315 projects. Evidence from within this office is eloquent 
testimony to the cursory way in which environmental impacts are 
treated.8 7 
This environmental degradation cannot simply be reversed. 
Land under vegetation absorbs more heat than bare sandy soil. 
Thus, when there is plant cover, the ground is warmer. 
Consequently, there are more vigorous thermal undercurrents 
which take moisture, provided by that very plant cover, up to 
high altitudes where it condenses. Overgrazing strips vegetation 
and leads to a new stable state of bare cool soil, lower rainfall and 
sparse vegetation. According to a report in The New York Times, 
"although the verdict is not wholly certain it is possible that parts 
of the western Sahel have already switched to a new lower 
rainfall regime."88 Environmental factors are important, not 
because political and economic policy cannot change them, but 
because they do. 
Debt and interest rates 
87 Hayter and Watson (1989). op. cit., p. 112. 
88 New York Times, October 18, 1985, p. 11. 
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It is difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of the debt crisis. 
In 1986 Mexico, which earns more in foreign exchange from oil 
than all its other exports put together, is expected to spend its 
entire revenue from oil in paying off the interest on its external 
debt. The Mexican government also borrows at home and pays 
interest on this domestic debt. In 1985 almost two-thirds of the 
Mexican government's income was spent paying off this domestic 
debt, leaving just over a third to meet total public expenditure. As 
Mexico has become more indebted, so the IMF and the 
international banks, which are its creditors, insist that the 
government open up the Mexican economy to foreign investment, 
sell off publicly owned companies and reduce subsidies, especially 
on food. The last measure is particularly perverse in its effects. 
As subsidies are withdrawn, inflation increases, interest rates rise 
further, and the Mexican government pays more to finance its 
debt. 
The situation in Africa is less severe in terms of the absolute 
magnitude of the debt, but in relative terms it is probably worse. 
In 1983 there were no African countries among the big debtors. 
By 1985 the total external debt of the 42 sub-Saharan economies 
was in the order of $130-135 billion. The true average debt-
service-to-exports ratio in these countries, excluding debt arrears 
and rescheduling, was about 35 per cent in 1985.89 This is less 
89 Cheru, Fantu (1989). The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development, 
and Democracy, Zed, London, pp. 22-45. 
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than in many Latin American countries-- Brazil, Mexico, Chile and 
Argentina are spending most of their export earnings on debt 
interest-- but it is more critical in Africa for another reason. Put 
starkly, much of sub-Saharan Africa is literally starving while 
debt interest is being paid. 
The case of the Sudan in the mid 1980s is illustrative of 
what is happening in Africa. The Sudan had a $78 million proposal 
for emergency aid and $213 million in interest due, after 
rescheduling on $10 billion of external debts. Paying interest at 
this rate, for a poor country like the Sudan, means effectively 
cutting grain imports needed to avert starvation or fuel imports 
needed to keep the economy operating. In the words of a recent 
report, a failure to alter the existing debt imbalance will mean m 
human terms for most Africans increased political and social 
instability (or worse), severe deprivation for a majority - and 
premature death for hundreds of thousands a year.9 o 
It is worth remembering how the debt crisis arose in the 
first place. After the first oil shock in 1973 there was a fourfold 
increase in oil prices. The OPEC countries invested their large 
export surpluses in the Euro-currency market and the 
international banks. At that time conditions for borrowing were 
easy and the banks wanted to lend. It was also profitable to 
borrow because interest rates were low compared with world 
inflation figures. Interest rates were often negative in real terms. 
90 Ibid., pp. 102-125. 
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World inflation figures also cut the value of the accumulated debt. 
The banks then set about lending money enabling developing 
countries to "adjust" to the effects of oil price rises. But, 
adjustment is often a euphemism for policies which imply a drop 
m living standards.91 
The real crisis came after the second oil shock in 1979. Just 
when debtor countries needed credit, they found high real-
interest rates, and the availability of credit from OPEC also 
declined. By August 1982 the Mexican debt crisis forced the IMF, 
the United States government and the private banks to assemble a 
huge debt-rescue package. Other countries followed, in Latin 
America and elsewhere. Accompanying the increased debts was 
an overvalued dollar-exchange rate which undermined national 
currencies and led to the flight of capital: over $11 billion dollars 
left Argentina in 1981/2; $17 billion left Mexico in the same 
period.92 
Given the sacrifices implied by structural adjustment policy, 
it may well be asked what prevents debtor countries from 
defaulting completely? If payments on the debt are suspended 
(moratorium), the costs to the 30 or so international banks which 
have benefited from high interest rates would be serious. It would 
91 Payer, Cheryl (1989). "Causes of the debt crisis," in Onimode, Bade (ed.) 
The IMF, The World Bank and The African Debt: The Social & Political 
Impact, Zed Books, London, pp. 8-16. 
92 O'Brien, Paul (1986). " The Debt Cannot be Paid," Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 12-36. 
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have cost them billions, had payments been suspended, making a 
considerable impact on United States capital markets. If there 
were a debt default, the United States banks involved could be 
ruined. It is not surprising, then, that the banks (the IMF and 
Northern political leaders) favor the idea of debt rescheduling. 
This brings them rescheduling fees, it spreads the interest rate 
and it protects their assets at book value. 
The short-term solutions that have been found to the debt 
crisis are obviously good for the banks, but the more critical 
question is what they imply for the debtors. O'Brien argued in the 
mid 1980s that Latin American countries, at least, should 
seriously consider the advantages of a co-ordinated default. 93 The 
way that you interpret a managed solution to the debt depends on 
what you think are the prospects for the world economy. An 
objective assessment would hardly lead to optimism. The United 
States is the best example of a rich country engaged in deficit 
financing to maintain consumption levels. In 1985 Susan George 
commented on the fact that the United States, with a population of 
220 million owed nearly $6,000 billion, approximately twice as 
much debt as all the Third World countries put together with one-
twelfth the number of people.94 
Most debtor countries in the South are currently at the 
mercy of a logic which has nothing to do with meeting basic needs 
93 Ibid. 
94 George, Susan (1985). op. cit. p. 102. 
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or reducing the vulnerability of the poor. The IMF, as George has 
pointed out, exists to promote the growth and development of 
world trade. World trade, as discussed, can be expanded without 
net benefits accruing to poorer trading "partners". The IMF exists 
to ensure that trade and economic growth are maintained, 
whatever the social and environmental consequences. Countries 
were once considered to be in trouble when the average debt ratio 
exceeded 25 percent of their export earning, and this makes it 
absolutely clear just how much trouble they are in now that many 
countries in Africa have a debt ratio nearer to 35 percent. What is 
required is not a renegotiation of their debts, and a rescheduling 
of their indebtedness, but a completely new approach to the debt 
problem. Such an approach will need to address the vexed issue of 
national sovereignty and the operations of transnational 
corporations. 
Sovereignty and the multinationals 
During the last decade there has been mounting criticism of 
the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the "development" 
of the South. Most of this criticism has focused on the 
"irresponsibility" of TNCs which put profits before nature 
conservation and, for that matter, human livelihoods. Criticism 
tends to overlook the essentially rational and systematic way in 
which TNCs operate, usually with the support or complicity of 
national governments in Third World countries. It also overlooks 
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the fact that TNCs act as self-contained systems, commissioning 
and utilizing technology, creating and exploiting consumer 
markets in the North, using "transfer pricing" to ensure that the 
benefits of peripheral development accrue to the center. The TNCs 
are the main beneficiaries of a free-trade/open-market system; 
they benefit from being able to sell expensively and buy cheaply, 
whether it is labor, primary products, services, or technology.95 
There are also political advantages to be gained from 
commanding the process of resource-food conversion without 
necessarily having a major stake in the ownership of another 
country's resources. Nationalist sentiment was a potent force in 
persuading the Brazilian government to tighten its control over 
foreign-owned corporations in the development of the Amazon, 
although the model of "development" within which these 
corporations operated has still not been seriously challenged.9 6 
Indeed the state is frequently the guarantor of TNCs, not only by 
providing a legal basis for their operation, but by underwriting 
them financially. During the 1970s much of Latin America's 
agriculture became increasingly tied to high-technology inputs 
which received the bulk of state subsidies and preferential 
credits. In 1975 over half of Latin America's chemical fertilizers 
were imported. The interest of United States' companies in tractor 
95 See Barnet, Richard and Ronald Miiller (1974). Global Reach: The Power 
of the Multinational Corporation, Simon & Schuster, New York. 
96 Choucri, Nazli (1991). "The Global Environment and Multinational 
Corporations," Technology Review, April, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 24-40. 
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production was similarly important. The major thrust of 
agricultural policy in Latin America was to ensure that modern, 
commercial agriculture could be undertaken "competitively" 
through subsidized credit, fiscal concessions to importers and 
industrial suppliers. Guaranteed prices were paid to co-operating 
farmers and scarce public investment was allocated to large-scale 
physical infrastructure in areas like Northeast Brazil and 
Northwest Mexico, where heavily capitalized, irrigated agriculture 
was promoted. These policies met the demands of external 
agencies for "modernization" of agriculture, while providing 
opportunities for the realization of profits at critical stages in the 
production cycle.97 
The increasing activities of TNCs in the South is thus the 
outcome of both a concern with their domestic profitability, and 
changes in the technology that TNCs employ. TNCs have 
themselves affected the international division of labor. Third 
World agricultural producers, notably in Latin America where 
agriculture has long been dominated by North American interests, 
have come to play a provisioning role within an evolving economic 
and technological system which has its origin and rationale in the 
North. 
Another essential element in the way TNCs operate is their 
need to gain access to raw materials and labor. In their search to 
97 Lopez Cordovez, L. (1982). "Trends and Recent Changes in the Latin 
American Food and Agriculture Situation," CEPAL Review , vol 16, United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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find supplies of both, TNCs inevitably act in ways which are 
prejudicial to the economic and political sovereignty of national 
states. Agro-industrial operations in California and Mexico are a 
good example. In California, American companies own the land 
used in agribusiness operations and the capital to exploit it. They 
need to import the Mexican labor employed in the fields and the 
packing plants. In Mexico the land used by United States 
agribusiness is Mexican-owned, and the labor is freely available 
from the impoverished smallholder sector, but the capital has to 
be imported from the United States. The frontier is a flexible 
concept which corresponds more closely with geography than with 
the workings of agro-industry. TN Cs increasingly make decisions 
that transcend their basis in legal ownership and materially affect 
nutrition, land tenure, and the environment. 9 8 
By commanding the necessary technology TNCs can also 
ensure that there is an international division of labor in another 
sense. Not only do less developed countries provide most of the 
raw materials for industrial processing carried out in the North, 
but by employing peasant farmers on a contractual basis TNCs 
also enable the costs of maintaining the labor force to be passed 
on to poorer households. For most of these people employment by 
TNCs is on a casual basis. Whether they produce on their own land 
or work as seasonal laborers, they need other sources of livelihood 
98 Schmidheiny, Stephan (1992). Changing Course: A global perspective 
on development and the environment, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 45-60. 
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support, from the land or from urban employment. Many are 
being forced into making ever increasing demands on their 
environment by their dependence on the market. They resort to 
short-term unsustainable agronomic practices, shortening fallows, 
acquiring fertilizers on credit, removing tree and plant cover, 
reducing the range of crops within their "farming system." Others 
become ecological refugees, forsaking their homes for other areas 
where they can establish settlements. A substantial part of 
transnational migration from Haiti, the Sahel and Central America 
has environmental, as well as political, roots.99 
This underlines another effect of transnational penetration. 
Many of the consequences of agricultural intensification are 
directly attributable to agribusiness penetration. Agribusiness 
implies agricultural intensification, specialization in a few 
laboratory-bred crops and their treatment with chemical 
fertilizers. The problem is that even when the target of the 
production system (on-farm productivity) behaves as expected, 
other elements in the farmer's system are usually adversely 
affected (other crops, animals, other income-earning 
opportunities), while increasing intensification brings 
deterioration to elements outside the farming system (through 
pesticide use, land erosion and changes in diet, for example). TNCs, 
in making themselves more competitive, reduce the flexibility and 
99 Choucri, Nazli (1991). op. cit. 
risk-avoidance which are essential to successful peasant 
agriculture. 
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Perhaps the most vivid example of transnational penetration 
1s the destruction of the tropical rainforests. The statistics are 
appalling. In the last 25 years more than a quarter of Central 
America's rainforest has been turned to grass, and almost all the 
beef produced on it has gone to American hamburger chains. In 
1960 the United States hardly imported beef at all. By 1981, 
800,000 tons were being imported annually at a price less than 
half that obtained in the United States. As documented in the 
journal Environment: "the average domestic cat in the United 
States now consumes more beef than the average Central 
American." 100 The 1970s was the decade in which one product 
received more development aid than any other in human history. 
The promotion of beef production in Latin America attracted over 
$10 billion, at 1983 prices from the World Bank and the Inter 
American Development Bank.1o1 
Elsewhere in the humid tropics the story has been much the 
same: large-scale finance for fore st clearing and resettlement 
schemes, with the accent in Africa and Asia on timber production 
rather than ranching. In Indonesia it is planned to resettle four 
million people from Java, Bali and Lombok on the Outer Islands, 
100 Nations, B. and L. Korner (1983). "Cattle Eat the Forest," Environment, 
vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 32-41. 
101 Ibid. 
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which have little physical infrastructure and few support services. 
The human cost cannot be counted in full, since there is nobody 
but the settlers to count it. Those who have participated in such 
transmigration schemes have returned to speak about the 
experience in a tone not dissimilar to that of survivors from the 
holocaust. As demonstrated by the Brundtland Commission, 
transmigration is neither a substitute for redistributive land 
reform nor a viable solution to the over-population of Java.102 
Tropical fores ts are destroyed primarily for economic 
reasons and, although it is important that there is growing 
awareness of the ecological problems produced, such awareness 
alone cannot be expected to turn the tide. Only radical changes m 
structural policies can do that. Earning foreign exchange, which is 
the primary objective, is not merely an objective of governments 
in the South, it is also the objective of their creditors, the IMF and 
the international banking community. The need to earn foreign 
exchange is compounded by the need to grow more food, and 
many countries are less exercised about what food is produced 
than that it is produced at all. The wilderness areas whose 
conservation even the World Bank now recognizes represent 
wasted, unproductive land to financially bankrupt governments m 
the South, intent on avoiding radical land reform at any price. The 
colonization of the tropical forest thus becomes a national goal, 
invested with the kind of symbolic importance which ecologically 
102 WCED (1987). op. cit., p. 38. 
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minded people reserve for endangered species. It is important to 
recognize these contradictions, painful though they are, for 
otherwise one cannot hope to enlist governments, international 
agencies and private individuals in sustainable tropical-forest 
utilization. 
This chapter has argued that the structure of the 
international political economy is partly responsible for the 
worsening condition of local environments in many parts of the 
South. The pressure to achieve more economic growth, oriented to 
external demands in a period of indebtedness, to deepened the 
crisis afflicting the local economy in many rural areas. Instead of 
the sustainable development of their resources, especially those 
controlled by women, the strategies of survival forced upon rural 
households have led to overintensive cultivation, the depletion of 
capital stocks (including animals) and migratory patterns designed 
to increase cash income. Food production on the farm, which in 
Africa especially is often the province of women, has taken second 
place to short-term unsustainable strategies which serve to divest 
the farm household of entrepreneurial control. In the next 
chapter the question of sustainable agriculture will be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 4. SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 
Despite an agricultural revolution in the South over the 
course of a single generation that has produced enormous benefits 
for farmers, consumers and economies, many of the poorest rural 
people are yet to benefit. They live in regions with poor-quality 
soils and unpredictable rainfall. Either they are remote from 
agricultural services that promote the package of inputs necessary 
to add value, or they cannot afford to take a risk by adopting the 
whole package. More importantly, many simply find the package 
unsuitable for their needs and tastes. In addition, inappropriate 
use of inputs imposes on others from agricultural pollution and 
environmental degradation. 
If the projected world population of 8 to 13 billion people is 
to be fed, new efforts based on maximizing the use of renewable 
resources internal to the farm will be required. These will be 
centered on sustainable agricultural technologies capable of 
achieving permanent improvements to agricultural production 
that do not damage the environment. 
Overview of an Agricultural Revolution 
The success of the Green Revolution is simply explained. 
Agricultural scientists bred new varieties of staple cereals that: 
one, matured quickly, so permitting two or three crops to be 
grown each year; two, were day-length insensitive, so could be 
extended to farmers at a wide range of latitudes; and three, were 
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producers of more grain at the expense of straw. These modern 
varieties were distributed to farmers together with high-cost 
inputs, including inorganic fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, credit 
and water regulation. These technical innovations were then 
implemented in the best-favored agro-climatic regions and for 
those classes of farmers with the best expectations for realizing 
the potential yield increases. I 03 As a result, average cereal yields 
have roughly doubled in twenty-five years. The remaining 
production growth has been met through a 20 percent expansion 
of the agricultural area. 
Yet in many ways the most difficult challenges are just 
beginning. The world population is not thought likely to stabilize 
until there are between 8 and 13 billion people. Even at the 
lowest estimates, and given current inequitable access and rights 
to resources, there will be a need for agricultural production to 
increase substantially if adequate nutrition are to be maintained. 
Without very considerable growth the prospects for many people 
in the Third World are bleak. Given the extraordinary success of 
the Green Revolution, many believe that this model of 
development continues to provide the most effective and efficient 
prospect for all people of the South. However, not only have 
many people missed out on the benefits of this revolution. There 
have also been hidden costs. 
103 Conway, Gordon and Barbier, Edward (1990). After the Green 
Revolution, Earthscan, New York, pp. 20. 
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Characteristics of inputs 
By focusing on the import to farms of new seeds or animal 
breeds, the Green Revolution has encouraged the development of 
two distinctly different types of agriculture in countries of the 
South. The first type has been able to respond to the technological 
packages, producing high-external input (HEI) systems of 
agriculture.104 These tend to be endowed with good soils and 
adequate supply of water, through either stable rainfall or 
irrigation systems, and access to marketing infrastructure, modern 
farm inputs, machinery, transport, agroprocessing facilities and 
credit. 
HEI systems are found in the large irrigated plains and deltas of 
South, South-east and East Asia, and parts of Latin America and 
North Africa. They tend to be focused upon monocrops and mono-
animal enterprises, and geared for sale. So they include lowland 
irrigated rice, wheat and cotton; plantations of bananas, 
pineapples, palm oil, and sugar cane; market gardening near to 
urban centers; and intensive livestock rearing and ranching. I 05 
l 04 For a discussion on High and Low internal inputs see Francis, C.A. 
(1989). Internal Resources for Sustainable Agriculture, Sustainable 
Agriculture Programme Gatekeeper Series no. 8, International Institute for 
Environment and Development, London. 
105 Wolf, Edward (1986). Beyond the Green Revolution: New Approaches 
for third world agriculture, Worldwatch Paper, no. 73, Worldwatch 
Institute, Washington, DC. 
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The second type comprises all the remaining agricultural 
and livelihood systems which, in terms of area, are in the great 
majority. These are low-external input (LEI) systems and are 
located in drylands, wetlands, uplands, near-deserts, mountains, 
and hills. Farming systems in these areas are complex and 
diverse, and rural livelihoods are dependent on wild resources as 
well as agricultural produce. Agricultural yields are low, and the 
poorest countries tend to have higher proportions of these 
agricultural systems.106 Diversity means that what is appropriate 
for one farmer may not be for a neighbor; they are remote from 
markets and infrastructure; they are located on fragile or problem 
soils; and they have very low productivity. 
The number of people of directly supported by LEI systems 
1s enormous, probably some 1.4 billion. Yet "most agricultural 
development assistance ... has emphasized external resources." 107 
They can neither afford to sustain the use of external resources, 
nor produce them in their own economies; the alternative lies m 
LEI systems, as for most poor countries no viable alternative 
exists.108 The proportion of major crops currently planted to 
modern seed's varies widely across continents. Where HEI 
106 Francis (1989). op cit., pp. 3-5. 
107 OT A (Office of Technology Assessment) (1988). Enhancing Agriculture 
in Africa: A Role for US Development Assistance, VS Government Printing 
Office, Washington, DC, p. 2. 
108 Chambers, Robert, Pacey, A. and Thrupp, L. ( 1989). Farm First: Farmer 
Innovation and Agricultural Research, Intermediate Technology 
Publications, London, pp. 15-28. 
systems occur, in almost every case external inputs have been 
substituted for the internal resources, rendering them less 
powerful .109 
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The direct economic benefits of HEI systems are clear: more 
food per acre and per farm worker. Yet despite these returns, 
and considerable investment in research and extension, why have 
more farmers and countries not adopted HEI systems for 
agriculture? 
Farmer's views of modern varieties 
Using the conventional criterion of productivity, agricultural 
development judges HEI systems as successes. Yet farming 
households do not always see the modern varieties and associated 
package of external inputs in the same way as researchers. Their 
criteria for evaluating and making choices are frequently so 
different that the best products of research services are 
sometimes rejected, while others judged inappropriate are chosen 
by farmers as favorable. 
In Colombia, a high-yielding variety of bush beans was 
rejected by farmers because the variable color made marketing 
difficult. Another variety rejected by researchers for its small 
bean size was acceptable because, as one farmer put it, "it is good 
for consumption purposes because it swells to a good size when 
109 Lipton, Michael and Longhurst, R. (1989). New seeds and poor people, 
Unwin Hyman, New York, p. 40. 
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cooked--it yields in the pot." 11 o In the Philippines, sweet potato 
varieties bred for high yield and sweet taste were rejected by 
upland farmers who preferred rapidly vining varieties that 
prevented weed growth and rain-induced soil erosion. They also 
selected varieties tolerant to weevil damage during the 
underground storage phase, as this meant the potatoes could be 
harvested only as required.111 
Taste is one of the factors in the failure of modern corn 
seeds to be adopted widely .112 From the 1960s, agricultural 
research in Malawi has focused on dent varieties that have soft 
starch which is easier for modern rollers to handle to produce 
flour. But rural people prefer flint varieties for their taste and 
high starch content, and because they are less subject to insect 
damage during storage. Researchers accepted these drawbacks, 
but suggested that further new technologies would solve the 
problems. This would comprise the promotion of insecticides to 
control storage pests, and mechanical mills to overcome the 
difficulties of hand-milling dents. But the package was too costly 
and risky to farmers. By the beginning of the 1990s, only 5 
110 Ashby, J.A., Quiros, C.A. and Rivera, Y.M. (1987). Farmer Participation 
in On-Farm Trials, Overseas Development Institute, London, p. 17. 
111 Yapa, Lakshman (1993). "What are improved seeds? An Epistemology of 
the Green Revolution," Economic Geography, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 254-273. 
112 Barbier, Edward (1990). Malawi--Land Degradation in Agriculture 
Environment, International Institute for Environment and Development, 
London, p.19. 
percent of the corn area was being planted to modern dent 
varieties _113 
The Social Construction of Scarcity 
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A common assumption of development theory is that people 
and places are poor because they lack resources: however, a 
reasonable case can be made that, in many instances, modern 
technologies have contributed to scarcity by destroying existing 
sources of supply and creating demands for new ones.114 
Ecological relations of improved seeds provide an excellent 
example of this argument because they have replaced the 
sustainable reproductive capacity of local agriculture with the 
productive capacity of nonrenewable industrial inputs.115 
Over thousands of years farmers participated in the 
selection of improvement of seeds for food, fodder, and fiber. 
However, during the last 50 years a large industry has grown up 
around the sale of improved seeds; in the mid-1980s, it was a 
worldwide market of nearly $45 billion.116 The capacity of seeds 
113 Ibid. 
114 In making this point, I do not in any way with to be misunderstood as 
making a Julian Simon-type of argument about unlimited resources and the 
planet's "vast growth potential." Simon, J. and Kahn, J. (1984). The 
resourceful earth, Blackwell, New York. 
115 Shiva, Vandana (1991). The violence of the green revolution. Zed Books, 
London, pp. 24-41. 
116 Doyle, J. (1986). Altered harvest: Agriculture, genetics, and the fate of 
the world's food supply, Penguin Books, New York, p. 33 
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to naturally reproduced themselves had acted as a barrier to the 
entry of capital into developing improved seed, but techniques 
such as hybridization helped capital cross this threshold. Some 
have suggested that the very choice of this technique depended 
on its potential to transform seeds into a commodity .11 7 For 
example, corn reproduces itself through both self and cross 
pollination. A variety of corn can be selected for particular traits, 
and by inbreeding it (self-pollination) over several generations a 
pure inbred line can be developed. The yield of such an inbred 
line is poor, however. Several decades ago, U.S. crop breeders 
discovered that a high-yielding hybrid corn can be obtained by 
crossing two pure inbred lines, due to a phenomenon known as 
heterosis or hybrid vigor. The commercially available hybrid 
seeds are produced by double-crossing two previous hybrids. 
Corn raised from hybrid seeds cannot be saved and used as seed 
for future planting because their yields are erratic and poor. This 
means that farmers have to purchase seed from seed companies 
every year. This is an example of the social construction of 
scarcity, a design built into the very development of hybrids. Of 
the techniques available for the general improvement of crop 
yield, hybridization was chosen partly for its capacity to suppress 
the key function of reproduction, thus creating a social scarcity 
117 Kloppenburg, J .R. ( 1988). First the seed: The political economy of plant 
biotechnology 1492-2000, Cambridge University Press, New York, 114. 
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that would be magnified later in the context of poor farmers in 
the third world.11 8 
Another aspect of scarcity is that improved seeds do not 
increase yields by themselves. To quote from Shiva: 
The strategy of the Green Revolution ... put new 
demands on scarce renewable resources and generated 
new demands for non-renewable resources. The 
Green Revolution technology requires heavy 
investment in fertilizers, pesticides, seed, water and 
energy .119 
Increasingly an important source of fertilizer nitrogen is that 
obtained from industrial fixation. In most fertilizer plants, 
hydrogen is obtained from methane in natural gas. Ammonia 
production is expensive in terms of energy-rich fossil fuels. The 
world production of nitrogen fertilizer rose from about 6.5 million 
metric tons in 1955 to 67 .5 million metric tons in 1984.120 In 
1984 developing countries accounted for more than 40 percent of 
the world's consumption of nitrogen f ertilizer.121 The widespread 
use of chemical nitrogen also contributed indirectly to increasing 
scarcity by reducing the supply of naturally available organic 
nitrogen. It had the effect of underdeveloping knowledge of 
118 See Conway and Barbier ( 1990). op. cit., p. 16. 
119 Shiva, V. (1991). op. cit., p. 46. 
120 Cox, G.W., and Atkins, M. D. (1979). Agricultural ecology: An analysis of 
world food production systems, W.H. Freeman, San Francisco, pp. 313-314. 
121 Food and Agriculture Organization (1984). FAO fertilizer yearbook, FAO 
of the United Nations, New York, p. 51. 
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biological sources of nitrogen related to crop rotation, multiple 
cropping, incorporation of nitrogen rich legumes in agricultural 
production, use of agricultural and plant remains, and application 
of animal manure. Azolla, a fern grown in association with nee 
paddy, is an important source of natural nitrogen. Other 
strategies for reducing the use of chemical nitrogen include the 
growmg of plants that require less nitrogen or have a higher 
capacity for fixing nitrogen in root nodules.12 2 
The widespread and growing use of chemical pesticides is 
another example of the social construction of resource scarcity. 
Pesticides cause the large-scale destruction of nontarget 
populations, the genetic evolution of pesticide-resistant organisms, 
the contamination of water and agricultural produce, the 
reduction of soil organisms, the reduction of soil organisms that 
maintain the quality of humus in the soil; moreover, they pose 
health risks to agricultural workers. Apart from what are very 
serious environmental hazards, chemicals are also expensive, their 
use has increased the dependence of third world farmers on 
international capital, and their continued use over time has 
increased the demand for these products.12 3 
The pesticide industry -- that is, its research, development 
and marketing -- has had the effect of underdeveloping the 
emergence of alternative techniques. Which include: biological 
12 2 Doyle, J. (1986). op. cit., p. 95. 
123 Ibid. p. 120. 
71 
control through prey-predator relationships; cultural methods, 
such as crop rotation, multiple cropping, and companion planting, 
that alter the environment by making it less suitable for pests; 
and crop breeding programs that develop disease resistant plants. 
Indeed, of all the techniques mentioned above those that have 
had the most support are the chemical ones, because they create 
the most exchange value.124 Many of the alternative techniques 
mentioned, particularly the biological methods, work with natural 
cycles in the ecosystem by taking advantage of biological 
processes. They represent little cost to the user, but their 
development can be expensive because more sophisticated 
biocontrol requires much skill and funds. Even though more than 
20,000 serious pest are known natural enemies are known for less 
than 10 percent. Entomologist Paul Debach posits that this 
research is underfunded because biological methods do not 
generate profits the way synthetic chemicals do.125 
Concept of End-use Rational 
Another useful way to conceptualize the social origin of 
scarcity is to consider the end-use to which a technology is put.126 
124 Goodman, David and Redclift, Michael (1992). Refashioning Nature, 
Food, Ecology, and Culture, Routledge, New York, p. 37. 
125quoted in Nebel, B. J. (1991), Environmental science, Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., pp. 428-29. 
126 Reid, Walter (1989). "Sustainable Development: Lessons from Success," 
Environment, vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 27-35. 
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The concept of end-use rational involves the careful matching of 
resources and technology to particular uses so as to mm1m1ze 
waste of material and energy. To illustrate this idea, consider the 
energy required to produce nitrogen fertilizer: a pound of 
factory-produced nitrogen fertilizer requires about 19. 700 
thermal units of energy, while a pound of biological nitrogen 
obtained by plowing in a legume would use about 2, 700 thermal 
units.127 According to these figures, the expenditure of the extra 
17 ,000 BTU s represents a saving unavailable with factory-
produced nitrogen -- creation of scarcity. 
End-use logic has application in every area of technology: 
food, nutrition, agriculture, manufacturing, health care, housing 
construction, transportation, and education. In fact, the adoption 
of this principle in the context of SD gives new meaning to the 
terms resources, technology, and capital. End-use analysis begins 
with the needed use value and looks for the most direct way of 
satisfying it by using the minimum amounts of energy, material, 
and transport. This is called matching sources to end-uses. Thus 
the terms resources, technology, and capital have no universal 
meaning in the absence of a concrete end-use analysis of a given 
region. Indeed, the physical geography of region, its ecology, 
people's knowledge of plants and animals, are all part of the 
resource base.12 8 
127 Commoner, Barry (1977). The poverty of power:: energy and the 
economic crisis, Bantam Books, New York, p.156. 
128 Goodman .and Redclift (1992). op. cit.. pp. 4. 
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Building on Indigenous Knowledge 
In rural areas the livelihoods of poor households are 
diverse, commonly relying on a mix of agricultural produce, wild 
plants and animals, and trading. Over generations, people have 
developed a wealth of detailed knowledge about the quality and 
quantity of natural resources, and the means to manage and 
exploit them. This knowledge is a resource commonly neglected 
by agricultural projects, yet is critical to the success and 
improvement of low input systems. The first component of 
success requires taking the detailed local knowledge as a starting 
point and build upon it. Where agricultural development has 
done this, the economic benefits are remarkable. When 
development planning ignores this rule not only may goals not be 
met, but greater environmental and social damage may arise. 
Provided groups or communities are involved in 
identification of technology needs, the design of testing and 
experimentation, the adaptation to their own conditions and 
finally the extension to other then sustainable and cheaper 
solutions can be found. Development focusing on appropriate 
ecological pest, nutrient and water management practices can lead 
to at least a 50 percent increase in the yields of crops, livestock 
and trees.12 9 
129 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Pest management strategies 
Agricultural pests are thought to destroy some 10-40 
percent of the world's gross agricultural production. It is this 
potential for damage that has driven the search for synthetic 
pesticides and resulted in their widespread use. Pesticides, 
though, are not a perfect answer to controlling pests and 
pathogens. They can be dangerous to human health and damage 
natural resources and the environment. But more importantly to 
the farmer, pesticides are often inefficient at controlling pest.130 
They can cause pest resurgence by also killing off the natural 
enemies of the target pests. They can also produce new pests, by 
killing off the natural enemies of species which hitherto were not 
pest. Pests can become resistant to pesticides, so encouraging 
further applications; there are some 470 pest species known to be 
resistant to at least one product.131 Finally, pesticides provide no 
lasting control, and so, at best have to be repeatedly applied. 
Integrated pest management (IPM) systems make use of the 
ecological processes of predation, competition and parasitism in 
six broad strategies of pest control: 
• emphasizing natural enemies of pests and pathogens; 
130 Conway, Gordon and Pretty, J. N. (1991). Unwelcome Harvest: 
agriculture and pollution, Earthscan, New York, p. 45. 
131 National Research Council (1984). Pesticide resistance strategies and 
tactics for management, National Academy Press, Washington, DC p.4. 
• breeding crop plants or livestock for resistance to pests or 
pathogens; 
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• using locally available insecticidal compounds to reduce pests; 
• increasing agricultural diversity to reduce pest or pathogens 
numbers; 
• disrupting pest reproduction; 
• the selective use of pesticides, with low toxicity and little 
environmental hazard.132 
IPM is the integrated use of these pest control strategies m a 
way that not only reduces pest populations to economically 
acceptable levels but is sustainable and non-polluting. It is by no 
means a new approach. Indigenous farmers have long used 
combinations of these technologies to provide a degree of pest 
control. All IPM successes begin by understanding local practices 
and ecological processes and building upon these. One traditional 
technique on citrus trees has been to encourage populations of 
predatory ants that feed on various insects pests. In China, 
bamboo bridges have for some 1, 700 years been placed between 
branches to encourage movement of citrus ants from tree to tree, 
and whole orchards are colonized by securing a nest on one tree 
and then connecting this to others with the bamboo strips.13 3 
132 Conway and Pretty (1991). op. cit.. p. 51. 
133 Huang, H.T. and Pei Yang (1987). "Ancient culture of citrus ant as a 
biological agent," BioScience, vol. 37, pp. 665-71. 
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Although IPM is a more complex process than scheduled 
spraying of pesticides, the large-scale IPM for rice programs m 
the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand show that ordinary 
farmers are capable of rapidly acquiring the principles and 
approaches. This is producing a 50 percent reduction in 
insecticide use, a 10 percent increase in profits and a reduced 
variance of profits. The 50 percent reduction in pesticide use 
represents savings of $5 to 10 million each to Thailand and the 
Philippines, and $50 to 100 million to Indonesia.134 
Nutrient conservation strategies 
It is virtually impossible to maintain crop production 
without adding nutrients. When crops are harvested, nutrients 
are invariably removed and so have to be replaced. There are a 
variety of sources: the mobilization of existing nutrients in the 
soil and parent rocks; the fixing of nitrogen from the atmosphere; 
or the supply of organic or inorganic fertilizer. The options for 
nutrient conservation include improving the efficiency of 
fertilizers, using alternative sources of nutrients and 
environmental manipulation.135 
134 Kenmore, P., Litsinger, J.A., Bandong, J.P., Santiago, A.C. and Salac, 
M.M. (1987). "Philippine rice farmers and insecticides: thirty years of 
growing dependency and new options for change," in Tait, E.J. and 
Napometh, B. (eds.) Management of Pests and Pesticides: farmers' 
perceptions and practices, Westview Press, New York, p. 38. 
135 Nebel, B. J. (1991). op. cit., p. 420. 
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The application of fertilizer, ideally, should closely match the 
needs of crops; but often farmers, for reasons of cost, will apply 
fertilizer only once. Fertilizer is often applied in excess of need, so 
some nutrients are lost from the farm as nitrates to surface or 
ground water, or as ammonia or nitrous oxide to the atmosphere. 
Efficiency of uptake is influenced by the crops themselves, the soil 
type and the timing and appropriate placement of fertilizers. 
Farmers who can neither afford nor rely on a regular supply 
of inorganic fertilizers must find alternative organic sources of 
nutrients. Livestock manure's have been the traditional key to 
maintaining agricultural productivity in LEI systems, replenishing 
nutrients and improving soil structure. Composting is a technique 
of similar long standing that combines the use of animal manure's, 
green material and household wastes. The impact of legumes 
grown together with or before a cereal crop can further reduce 
and sometimes eliminate the need for nitrogen fertilizers.13 6 
Symbiotic bacteria present in specialized nodules that develop on 
the roots of the legumes can fix a considerable amount of nitrogen 
from the atmosphere. In well-nodulated and managed stand of 
legumes, fixation can double. The cultivation of cereals and 
legume crops together can improve both total yields and stability 
of production. Bushes and trees with nitrogen-fixing capacity 
136 Ibid. 
also have beneficial effects on plants growing with or after 
them.137 
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Nutrients are supplied when vegetation is incorporated in 
the soil as a green manure. This technique has been practiced for 
a long time; the Romans grew lupines and ploughed them in 
before sowing cereals more than 2,000 years ago. Quick-growing 
legumes are popular green manures. In Honduras, the 
introduction of the velvet bean as a green manure on poor soils 
has more than doubled corn yields.13 8 
Interventions that help to conserve soil and water are 
powerful techniques for nutrient conservation. Soil nutrients can 
be conserved by a wide range of physical structures of varying 
scale. Most of these are designed to check the surface flow of 
water, and thus perform the dual role of soil conservation and 
water harvesting and retention. If successful they can minimize 
the need for fertilizer application. The simplest approach is to 
construct earth bunds across the slope that act as a barrier to 
runoff. They are suitable on shallow slopes and are often used on 
tropical smallholdings together with contour planting. Sometimes 
the earth bunds are reinforced with vegetation such as crop stalks 
or trees. Such vegetative bunds are partly permeable, so crops 
planted in front of the bund also benefit from water runoff. More 
137 Conway and Pretty (1991). op. cit., p. 70. 
138 Bunch, Robert (1990), Low Input Soil Restoration in Honduras, 
Agriculture Program Gatekeeper Series no. 23, International Institute for 
Environment and Development, London, p.9. 
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elaborate are various forms of retention and bench terraces, 
which raise crop yields by some 30-50 percent over those on non-
terraces slopes. A lower-input alternative is to plant crops along 
contours. Water flow is slowed as it meets rows of plants growing 
perpendicular to the flow, thus improving infiltration. In strip 
cropping the main row crop is grown along the contour in wide 
strips alternating with strips of protective crop, such as grass or a 
legume.139 
These low-external input options for farmers comprise a 
wide range of interventions that will reduce the losses of nitrogen 
to the environment and act as alternatives to inorganic fertilizers. 
They are usually integrated on farms to give a finely tuned 
strategy specific to the physical and socio-economic conditions of 
individual farmers. As with IPM, integrated nutrient 
conservation successes have all begun with building on 
technologies that farmers are already using and with which they 
are already familiar. 
Building on local social organizations 
A common element of successful implementation of 
ecological sensitive agricultural technologies has been the 
attention paid to local social organizations. Success measured in 
the form of change sustained over long periods has been achieved 
139 Nebel, B. J. (1991). op. cit., p. 436. 
through either building on existing patterns of organization, 
formal or informal, or the development of new institutions. 
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Yet this has not always been so in agricultural development. 
There have been two quite different approaches, both with the 
same goal of widespread adoption of changes. The first ignores 
existing local formal and informal institutions by dealing with 
individual farmers or households. These are chosen partly for 
their likelihood to adopt new technologies and are expected to 
induce further adoption in their community through a 
demonstration effect. At the other extreme is the approach of 
building community-wide co-operatives or collectives, whose 
action is governed by members and whose impact is expected to 
be positive on all members .14 o 
There is evidence to suggest that both approaches are 
flawed. At best only a few people benefit, and the gap between 
the poorest and the relatively wealthy grows. At worst the 
technologies are only adopted under the close supervision of 
external officials, the departure of whom often signifies the end of 
the effective use of the technology. 
In the individual approach, the contract farmers are usually 
selected on the basis of literacy, wealth, readiness to change and 
progressiveness. This often sets them apart from the rest of the 
community. This approach is exemplified by the training and visit 
140 Merchant, Carolyn (1992). Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable 
World, Routledge, New York, p. 27. 
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system of extension widely adopted in the South over the two 
decades.141 Extension agents receive regular training to enhance 
their technical skills, which they then pass on to farmers through 
regular contact with the selected contact farmers. This technical 
advice and knowledge are then supposed to diffuse from the 
contact farmers to all other farmers. The secondary transfer of 
the messages, though, has been much less successful than 
predicted, and adoption rates are commonly very low among non-
contact farmers.142 
Despite the intention of involving the whole community 
directly, the community or collective approach to extending 
technologies to rural people has also resulted in inequitable 
development, with benefits being captured by the relatively well-
off. Large co-operatives, in which the needs of different members 
vary enormously and which are too large for widespread 
participation, have to be managed by small groups, usually 
compnsmg the most wealthy, to whom decision-making has been 
delegated. They are thus inevitably less effective in meeting the 
needs of the poor.143 
141 Morris, J. (1990). Extension Alternatives in Tropical Africa, Overseas 
Development Institute, London, p. 2. 
142 Dover, Michael and Talbot, Lee (1987). To Feed the Earth: Agro-ecology 
for Sustainable Development, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC, p. 
53. 
143 Raeth, Paul (1993). Agricultural Policy and Sustainability: Case Studies 
from India, Chile, the Philippines, and the United States, World Resources 
Institute, Washington, DC, p. 8. 
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Small Entrepreneurial groups 
The alternative lies in the middle ground with small groups 
of households with a common interest in resource management 
and control. Sometimes these are existing formal or informal 
groups, such as traditional leadership structures, water users' 
groups, neighborhood groups, youth groups, and housing societies. 
On other occasions they are groups formed with outside 
facilitation to take charge of and manage a new resource, such as 
safer users' associations for irrigation, credit groups for loans 
access, or water-point committees to manage pumps. These 
groups promote incentives and enforce rules and penalties aimed 
at eliciting behavior conducive to rational and effective use of 
resources.144 
It is widely believed that taking social considerations into 
account results in greater costs. The concrete economic evidence, 
however, suggests quite the opposite. One study of twenty-five 
multilateral projects, conducted five to ten years after project 
completion, found the flow of benefits to have risen or remained 
constant were institutional development had been important.145 
144 Uphoff, Norman (1990). "Paraprojects as New Modes of International 
Development Assistance," World Development, vol. 18, no. 11, pp. 1401-11. 
145 Cernea, Michael (1987). "Farmer organizations and institution building 
for sustainable development," Regional Development Dialogue, pp. 1-19. 
(Published by the United Nations Center for Regional Development, New 
York) 
Where it had been ignored, economic rates of return declined 
markedly, and in some cases had become negative. 
The benefits can have a wider social and environmental 
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significance. Groups commonly pass through several phases. First 
the group establishes agreed rules for management and decision-
making. These are then used by members as a vehicle to channel 
information or loans to individual members. As confidence grows 
with success, and resource bases expand, group activity evolves to 
an entrepreneurial stage where common action projects and 
programs are initiated.14 6 
The next phase comprises inter-group co-operation as 
several groups might come together to federate and pool 
resources and knowledge. This opens up economies of scale that 
bring greater economic and ecological benefits. Lastly, the 
emergence of groups and federated groups makes it easier for 
government and NGOs to develop direct links with the poor.14 7 
This results in greater empowerment of poor households, as they 
draw down on public services. It also permits more efficient 
passing of socially important messages relating to family planning, 
adult education, and sanitation. 
146 Ibid., p. 4. 
14 7 Bebbingtion, A. (1991). Farmer Organizations in Ecuador: 
Contributions to Farmer First Research and Development, Sustainable 
Agriculture Programme Gatekeeper Series no. 26, International Institute 
for Environment and Development, London. 
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Policy frameworks to support sustainable agriculture 
The current policy frameworks of national governments all 
over the world strongly favor the REI approach to agricultural 
development. Many countries are under multiple stresses from 
rising debt servicing requirements, and the declines in world 
commodity prices. These force debtor nations to take the short-
term view, and thus emphasize the expansion of export earnings 
and staple production, and the curbing of public expenditure. Yet 
increasing supply forces down world prices even further, a 
situation worsened by agricultural protectionism in the Northern 
trading blocs .14 8 
To overcome these pressing problems, policy makers tend to 
favor approaches for stimulating agricultural production that 
promise immediate returns, even if the long-term prospects are 
threatened. This means supporting large-scale enterprises, such 
as ranching operations plantations and large farms, through the 
subsidy of inputs, generous tax laws, selective extension of low-
interest credit and favorable product pricing.149 These incentives 
have helped boost production on more favorable lands, so 
spreading the adoption of Green Revolution technologies. But the 
long-term benefits of this strategy are not so clear. The costs 
incurred include resource degradation and increased inequity if 
agriculture expands into common property resources, if fertilizers 
148 Reid, Walter (1989). op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
149 Barbier, Edward (1989). op. cit., pp. 27-35. 
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and pesticides are used inefficiently because of their low price, if 
food imports are favored at the expense of appropriate local foods 
and if particular commodities are supported at the expense of 
diverse and mixed farming.150 
LEI agriculture will not flourish beyond the small-scale 
successes documented above unless concerted action is taken both 
by national governments and by multilateral and bilateral 
development assistance agencies to adjust institutional, economic 
and legal frameworks to shift the balance of support towards LEI 
agricultural systems. 
Economic Development Scarcity 
Production is commonly defined as the creation of use 
values. But under certain circumstances production not only 
creates use values but also destroys them. Scarcity is a relation 
that grows out of the characteristic of production and appears in 
numerous aspects of development. The focus here has been on 
the concrete manifestation of this phenomenon in agricultural 
modernization within the relations of HEI systems. To restate the 
argument: The social construction of scarcity began with the 
genetic tr an sf ormation of seeds into a nonreproducing commodity. 
The improved seeds were developed to respond to industrial 
inputs such as fertilizer, and pesticides. The creation of such 
demand creates scarcity by creating the need for these products. 
150 Dover, Michael and Talbot, Lee (1987). op. cit., p.61. 
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The continued use of inorganic fertilizer over a long period leads 
to the deterioration of soil structure and increased erosion, thus 
requiring larger quantities of fertilizer to simply maintain yields. 
The long-term use of chemical pesticides increases the demand 
not only for larger applications, but also for other, more powerful 
pesticides. The need for irrigation water to grow improved seeds 
creates a demand for the installation of infrastructure -- dams, 
canals, and wells -- and a demand for pumps, spare parts, and 
f ueI.151 Since these inputs are purchased in the market, obviously 
some classes of society will experience scarcity more severely 
than others. In very arid areas irrigation creates an added 
burden through salinization, leading to the loss of cultivable land. 
Good land can also be lost to waterlogging caused by irrigation-
induced raising water tables. In agricultural modernization the 
loss of knowledge of sustainable practices due to the devaluation 
of traditional indigenous knowledge (LEI) can cause decreased 
yields. The newer varieties of corn, wheat, and rice yield lower 
quantities of biomass for organic residue and animal fodder, 
depriving the soils of important sources of natural organic 
nutrients . 1 5 2 
Agricultural modernization through use of improved seeds 
was a model of scientific agriculture. At one end of this model 
were the crop breeding centers and gene banks, and at the other 
151 Yapa, Lakshman (1993), op. cit., p. 269. 
15 2 Ibid., p. 270. 
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were the large agricultural universities and extension services -- a 
system of science and technology that uses large amounts of 
scarce financial resources and creates extreme dependency. 
Furthermore, this model was instrumental in conferring more 
power to expert scientists, consultants, bankers, and agents of 
agribusiness, a shift that was justified in the name of increased 
food production to meet the urgent needs of the growing hungry 
masses. The real food needs of poor people served the ideological 
needs of the promoters of the model of improved seeds quite well 
by helping to marginalize the critics of HEI.15 3 
This chapter was partly an exercise in understanding how 
problems are identified and solutions are proposed. Since hunger 
and malnutrition are problems, the Green Revolution of improved 
seeds was adopted as the solution. But such solutions are in fact 
part of the problem, because poverty is a form of scarcity induced 
by the very process of development. The argument was 
illustrated by examining HEI and LEI systems. Clearly, there is a 
need for more analysis to prove the connection between 
development and scarcity. 
The experience explored, in this chapter, suggests that 
agricultural production in LEI systems can improve yields through 
sustainable methods, accompanied by further indirect economic 
benefits. Other, benefits are to preserve locally valued cultural 
153 Acre, A. and Marsden, T.K. (1993). "The Social Construction of Food: A 
New Research Agenda," Economic Geography, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 293-311. 
sites and globally valued biodiversity and ecosystems, both of 
which are threatened by HEI. 
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CHAPTER 5. SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Previous chapters have discussed what is happening to the 
environment in Third World countries, and the kinds of structural 
processes within the international economy which have alter the 
relationship between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. 
In discussing sustainable agriculture it was necessary to 
examine HEI and LEI within the context of peoples' choices and 
interests, as well as ecological principles. In this chapter the 
argument turns to the principles and methods of environmental 
management. When one considers the principles and methods of 
environmental management as practiced in the Third World, it 1s 
evident that most types of intervention are neither particularly 
effective nor grounded in an objective scientific approach. 
Further, this chapter looks at the market failures and government 
policies that are at the center of many environmental degradation 
problems facing the third world. Environmental management is 
usually a responsive set of techniques rather than a framework 
for implementing policy. It also becomes clear that what is meant 
by environmental management often ignores or devalues the 
experience of poor people in the South, those who are usually 
closest to the problems. Often solutions are imported from the 
experience of developed countries, using methodologies which are 
of little relevance to different circumstances. To begin to achieve 
success at implementing workable environmental policies in the 
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South one seems to require that first unlearn much of what one 
knows about conservation and the environment in the South. 
The premise of UNCED (the Earth Summit) was that global 
environmental management can work. The project, as it emerged 
out of Rio, has three principal approaches-- a growing body of 
international environmental treaties among nation-states, 
increased foreign aid for environmental protection and . 
management, and supposed poverty alleviation, channeled and 
managed mainly through the global environmental facility (GEF) 
and other financing arms of the World Bank. The vision is that 
investigators and officials can efficiently gather information, 
starting with countless local ecosystems and communities, and 
devise plans, programs, and rules at the local, national, and 
international level to administer and manage the biosphere.15 4 
The nation-state is the basic unit in such a system of global 
environmental management, though key powers at the global 
level are devolved to bureaucracies with universal 
responsibilities, such as the World Bank. In short, global 
environmental management assumes, to summarize an analysis 
published in The Ecologist, assumes universally applicable 
knowledge, effective global enforcement, and a world political 
culture in which such knowledge and enforcement would be 
grounded.155 I will examine these assumptions in turn. 
154 Whose Common Future? Reclaiming the Commons (1993). Written by 
The Ecologist, Earthscan, London, pp. 5-6. 
155 "Global Management," (1992). Ecologist, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 180-2. 
The first question cannot be neatly separated from the 
structures of politics and governance in which it is embedded. 
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The growing revolt of local knowledge against the generalized, 
universal development schemes of the World Bank is a leading 
example.156 Surely, if decades of failed international 
development efforts have taught anything, it is the folly of 
induced, uniform HEI projects. Such schemes ignore and often 
destroy the local knowledge and social organization on which 
sound stewardship of ecosystems as well as equitable economic 
development depend. The most important elements of local 
knowledge are lost when attempts are made to abstract and 
generalize them to a national or global level-- if the attempt is 
made at all. This knowledge cannot be separated from he place 
in which it is used and continually evolving; nor can local people's 
customs, methods, and skills be artificially reconstructed through 
such efforts.157 
A typical example is muang phai, the watershed 
conservation measures and water-channel maintenance practice 
of village groups in Thailand. Foreign aid assisted the government 
irrigation authority to build new, more expensive dams and 
156 For examples in Africa see, Onimode, Bade (ed.) The IMF, The World 
Bank and The African Debt: The Social & Political Impact, Zed Books, 
London. 
157 Ghai, Dharam and Vivian, Jessica (1993). Grassroots Environmental 
Action: People's Participation in Sustainable Development, Routledge, New 
York, pp. 34-40. 
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channels, with little attention to local knowledge and practices. 
Control of the modernized infrastructure was vested in the 
government irrigation authority. Not unexpectedly, the new 
systems encountered unforeseen ecological and maintenance 
problems, since the alleged beneficiaries, local farmers, had been 
effectively dispossessed by the enclosure of the natural resources 
over which they once had real control. Attempts by the 
government irrigation authority, on the recommendation of 
foreign development experts, to set up new water users' 
associations among the farmers failed.158 There is ample 
documentation of analogous problems in many other areas of 
resource management, such as afforestation. The conclusions of 
an Indian fores try official, describing the ruin of a World Bank 
ref ore station project in the Himalayas which depended on the 
involvement of local villages, are pertinent: "these solutions do 
not require much money, but they require attention to details, 
commitment. That is what is lacking. What we have learned is 
that you cannot throw money at these problems." 15 9 
15 8 The discussion of muang phai irrigation is based on the following 
sources: Lohman, Larry (1991). "Who Defends Biological Diversity?" 
Ecologist, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 5-13; and Tangwisuttijit, Nantiya (1991). 
"Arguments that hold water," Nation, October 5, pp. Cl-C3. 
15 9 Coll, Steve (1992). "A plan to save the globe dies in a village," 
Washington Post, May 24, Al. In an article written in anticipation of the 
Earth Summit, Coll describes the collapse of a World Bank reforestation 
project in a small Indian village , Chopta. He views it as a troubling portent 
for the Earth Summit, which will called for more funding of similar 
projects. He cites interviews with villagers who contend that Indian 
government officials and World Bank staff never even visited the village, 
let alone tried to ascertain their needs. 
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The whole mode of global policy discourse that has become 
popular is so general as to be irrelevant to many real political and 
social challenges The key insight that such discourse misses is the 
extraordinary and irreducible connection of the biosphere at all 
levels. The diversity of local and regional ecosystems is the direct 
evolutionary and historical underpinning of the remarkable social 
and cultural diversity of human communities and societies. 
Effective social and political action has to be based at the 
appropriate level in terms of specific elements and constraints.160 
Events that have great global environmental and social 
repercussions may start from local incidents which at the time are 
indistinguishable from others. Over the late 1970s and 1980s, 
more than a thousand social activists were murdered in obscurity 
in the Brazilian Amazon, a number of them rubber tappers 
fighting for the protection of the rainforest. The assassination of 
their leader in December 1988, Chico Mendes, and the immediate, 
intensive efforts of a handful of environmental activists in Brazil 
and the United States to ensure that the lifework of Mendes would 
not be forgotten led to, an unprecedented outpouring of 
international concern. The social and ecological crisis in the 
Brazilian Amazon because an issue the Brazilian government could 
no longer ignore. The uproar over his death was also a factor 
160 Adams, William (1991). Green Development: Environment and 
Sustainability in the Third World, Routledge, New York, pp. 83-86. 
leading to the delay of World Bank loans, and the Brazilian 
government's subsequent lobbying to host the UNCED.161 
94 
The example of Mendes and the Brazilian rubber tappers 
aptly confirms that successful environmental management has to 
operate through the very social groups which are being 
marginalized by the development process. Attempts to manage 
the environment internationally through designated "biosphere 
reserves" in vulnerable areas and international agreements to 
restrict access to the commons, have proved largely 
unsuccessf uI.162 
The impotence of many existing international environmental 
treaties further confirms Redclift's observations, and gives little 
ground for confidence in the effectiveness of many future 
conventions if nothing else changes. Most environmental treaties 
have no effective provisions for enforcement, and few data are 
collected on compliance.163 Norway is a country that ranks near 
or at the top for its domestic and international environmental 
commitment. And yet a survey conducted by a Norwegian NGO, 
161 Ekins, Paul (1992). op. cit., pp. 83, 146. 
16 2 Durning, Alan (1989). "Action at the Grassroots: Fighting Poverty and 
Environmental Decline." Worldwatch Paper 88, Worldwatch Institute, 
Washington, DC., p. 18. 
163 French, Hilary (1992). "After the Earth Summit: The Future of 
Environmental Governance," Worldwatch Paper 107, Worldwatch, 
Washington, p. 28; see also Birnie, Patricia (1992). "International 
Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs, " in 
Hurrell, Andrew and Kingsbury, Benedict, eds (1992). The International 
Politics of the environment: actors, interests, and institutions, Oxford 
University Press, New York, pp. 70-78. 
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Bellona, concludes that Norway is probably failing to comply with 
twelve of twenty-seven international environmental agreements 
it has signed.164 
One of the main functions of the United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP) since its founding in 1972 has 
been to promote international agreements. Prior to the signing of 
the Montreal Protocol ( 1987) to regulate emissions of ozone-
destroying CFCs, UNEP's crowning achievement was its 
Mediterranean Action Plan (1975), the most successful by far of 
ten action plans to clean up the world's seas by region. The 
highlight of the plan is the Barcelona Convention (1978), in which 
all eighteen Mediterranean states agreed to take drastic actions to 
reduce and purify sewage and chemical waste effluents in coastal 
areas.165 
Although the Mediterranean Action Plan was a great 
diplomatic success -- it brought Albania, Libya, and Israel to the 
same negotiating table to agree on environmental collaboration --
it is an environmental failure. The Mediterranean is becoming a 
dead sea. After huge expenditures, only 30 percent of the 
Mediterranean's sewage receives any treatment whatsoever.166 
164 French, Hilary (1992), op. cit., p. 28. 
165 Haas, Peter (1990). Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of 
International Environmental Cooperation, Columbia University Press, New 
York, p. 9. 
166 Hinrichsen, Don (1991). review of Saving the Mediterranean: The 
Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, by Peter Haas, 
International Environmental Affairs, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 235. 
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In flagrant violation of other international conventions supposed 
to regulate discharge of petroleum at sea, vessels release 650,000 
tons of oil and other hydrocarbons annually in the Mediterranean, 
the equivalent of seventeen Exxon Valdez oil spills every twelve 
months.167 
The most optimistic assessments of environmental 
effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan claim that overall 
water quality has not gotten any worse since its inception in 1975, 
something of an accomplishment since population and production 
have increased in the Mediterranean region during the same 
period. According to Peter Haas, even these modest claims are 
anecdotal since "no synoptic data are available on Mediterranean 
water quality, nor are there time series data." 16 8 
Optimists concerning the effectiveness of international 
environmental treaties cite the Montreal Protocol mentioned 
above. Signed, 1987, it is an almost unqualified diplomatic and 
technical success: in 1990, the industrialized and developing 
countries revised it and agreed on the total phase-out of 
production of ozone-destroying CFCs (e.g. halons, methyl 
chloroform, and carbon chloride) by 2000. Unfortunately, to come 
to terms with many global environmental problems, diplomatic 
successes and technical breakthroughs alone may be largely 
irrelevant by the time they occur. The balance of the biosphere 
16 7 Haas, Peter (1990). op. cit. p. 130-131. 
168 Ibid. 
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does not always respond on command even when, such as the 
phasing out of CFCs, the world's nations become sufficiently 
concerned to agree on something and carry it out. The very thing 
that prompted unprecedented international action, the long-term 
persistence of ozone-destroying CFCs in the atmosphere once they 
are released, means that the ozone hole may continue to grow for 
years and perhaps decades after production and use of CFCs 
ceases. Moreover, as a National Academy of Sciences study on 
global environmental change warns, 
there is no guarantee that the chemicals developed as 
substitutes for CFCs will prove benign in the long run 
(CFCs themselves were thought to have ideal 
properties when they were introduced in the 1930s). 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and 
hydrohalocarbons (HFCs), prominent among the 
candidates to be used as substitutes for CFCs, have 
already provoked opposition from those concerned 
about their potential contribution to the greenhouse 
eff ect.169 
The same study warns against taking the Montreal Protocol as a 
precedent for dealing with global environmental change. The 
Montreal Protocol requires no real changes in national and global 
economic and social behavior; it phases out one technical fix and 
replaces it with another, which, it is hoped, will prove 
environmentally more benign. Truly addressing other global 
environmental problems-- tropical deforestation and climate 
169 Morrisette, Peter and Plantinga, Andrew (1991). "Global Warming: A 
Policy Review," Policy Studies Journal, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 163-172. 
change, for example-- may require changes of historical 
dimensions, involving millions or even hundreds of millions of 
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responsible actors, and poses thorny questions of equity within 
nations and among them.1 7 o 
Centralized, environmental management fails at the national 
level, too, in most third world countries. Costa Rica is a 
particularly illuminating example since it has often been cited as a 
model, for having set aside and protected a larger proportion of its 
forests and other natural areas than the United States. Costa Rica 
has benefited from a more intense level of international 
environmental assistance than almost any other country, through 
project oriented NGOs like the World Wildlife Fund and a variety 
of other agencies. It is also, the beneficiary of one of the largest 
"debt for nature" swaps. Indeed, partially because of this 
international attention, an oversized environmental bureaucracy 
has proliferated in Costa Rica over the past fifteen years. A 1988 
study identified twenty-seven "sections, divisions, units, juntas, 
institutes, and councils often working at cross purposes and 
almost never acting in cooperation with each other, charged with 
implementing one or another aspect of environmental policy."171 
The country has over 1,500 different environmental laws and 
170 Ibid. 
171 Carriere, Jean (1991). "The Crisis in Costa Rica: An Ecological 
Perspective," in Goodman, David and Redclift, Michael, eds., Environment 
and Development in Latin America: The Politics of Sustainability, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, England, p.194. 
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decrees in force, many of them incompatible with one another, 
something that is not the problem it appears, since few laws are 
enforced.172 
In recent years, Costa Rica has had one of the highest rates 
of deforestation of any nation on earth, averaging 4 percent 
annually for much of the 1980s.l 73 By 1985, 25 percent of the 
area of the country's legally protected forest reserves had been 
cleared, and many of the country's famed national parks were 
threatened or already partly deforested. I 7 4 Most of the 
deforestation has proceeded through a cycle that starts with 
logging, followed by occupation for three to five years by landless 
farmers, and finally conversion into cattle pastures. The deeper 
causes are structural ones that post-UNCED solutions of global 
environmental management, such as the biodiversity convention 
and more aid for environmental projects, could hardly begin to 
address, highly unequal land tenure coupled with typical 
macroeconomic crisis linked to the country's declining earning 
from commodity exports and the increasing burden of its foreign 
debt. 
By the mid-1980s, Costa Rica had the highest per capita 
foreign debt in the Third World; $1,500 for every inhabitant of 
the country. Forty percent of Costa Rica's foreign exchange 
1 72 Ibid., p. 195. 
173 World Resources Institute, World Resources 1990-1991, p. 102. 
174 Carriere (1991). op. cit., p. 195. 
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earnmg was going to service this debt, and tree-quarters of all the 
new foreign loans the country received simply went to help pay it 
back.175 The country was obliged to follow the conditions of a 
typical World Bank/IMF adjustment program, resulting in 
disproportionate budget cuts for the National Parks Service and 
the Forestry Directorate, as well increased economic pressures on 
the poorer, landless members of the population to migrate into 
still unoccupied forest lands and protected areas.176 A plausible 
case can be made that the adverse environmental effects of the 
World Bank sponsored adjustment program far exceed in scale 
and magnitude whatever marginal environmental benefits the 
country might obtain from a few million dollars for discrete 
environmental projects it might receive from an expanded global 
environment facility. 
Indigenous environmental management 
It would be inaccurate to assume that environmental 
management is the sole prerogative of technically trained people 
from developed countries. Many rural people using simple 
technologies in the Third World possess a fund of information 
about their environment in ways that are sustainable in the long 
term. However, the experience and knowledge of such people is 
only rarely incorporated in the formal structure of rural 
175 Ibid., pp. 192-193. 
176 Ibid. 
environmental planning in developing countries. 
101 
In the previous 
section some of the limitations of the kind of environmental 
management of the North were identified. It is now necessary to 
ask, What are the implications of seeking to learn from indigenous 
experiences of managing the environment for the development of 
rural societies in the South? 
First, it is clear that among indigenous people (tribal or 
"native" peoples) of Third World countries, sustainable practices 
are adhered to because traditionally they were the only guarantee 
of survival. It is one of stewardship, particularly in societies 
where the use of natural resources were not necessarily tied to 
their ownership. Ovington and Fox explain: 
In the case of the Australian Aboriginals, identification 
(with their environment) after two or three thousand 
human generation is so complete that they do not 
separate themselves from their environment. They 
use themselves as part of the landscape, not apart 
from it...Once people are taken out of close contact 
with the natural environment which sustains them, 
the perception of dependence fades. The notion that 
the ultimate source of food, shelter, new crops, new 
drugs and new materials must ultimately come from 
the Earth loved forces in this change of perception. I 7 7 
Not all human groups live as closely or as symbiotically with their 
environment as the Australian Aboriginals, but the recognition 
that people depend upon their environment for their survival is 
widespread. A particular cultural group will not necessarily 
177 Ovington, J. and Fox, A. (1980). Wilderness - A Natural Asset, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 58. 
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respect the constraints on resource use stemming from the 
theoretical carrying capacity of land, but the knowledge gained 
from sustainable resource use forms part of the environmental 
practices of most indigenous populations. People are used to 
interfering and modifying their own management practices and 
have grown used to living with the consequences of their action. 
It is much more difficult to predict, or justify, interference in 
culturally rooted practices in the interest of management 
strategies that are imposed from outside. As Nowicki puts it: 
" ... there is a difference in making a punctual investment which 
increases the overall productive capacity of an ecological system 
which supports itself, and the investment which changes initial 
circumstances so that the system is no longer self-supporting." 178 
It should be remembered that, within most indigenous 
groups whose livelihoods are not dependent on commodity 
production for the market, there is no internal tendency towards 
the maximization of profits or the creation of an economic surplus. 
The more intensive use of traditional techniques is linked to a 
strategy for minimizing risks and widening options in the face of 
the insistent process of capital accumulation. In the course of 
development indigenous environmental knowledge is often lost, 
because it becomes less relevant to the new situation and because 
178 Nowicki , P. (1985). "Cultural Ecology and Management of Natural 
Resources or Knowing When Not to Meddle," in McNeely, J. and Pitt, D., 
Culture and Conservation: The Human Dimension in Environmental 
Planing, p. 285. 
it is systematically devalued by the process of specialization 
around competitive production for the market.17 9 
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Traditional environmental knowledge is not only devalued 
by development institutions, it is also largely overlooked in the 
environmental management literature, as Norgaard documents.180 
This is partly because of the way such knowledge is recorded in 
the cultures of native peoples. Without knowledge of the culture 
a people possess one is unlikely to be aware of their knowledge of 
their environment. The corollary is that, if we want to know how 
ecological practices can be designed which are more compatible 
with social systems, you need to embrace the insight of indigenous 
people, including their ways of organizing their knowledge of their 
environment. However, Norgaard argues, traditional knowledge 1s 
location specific and only arrived at "through a unique co-
evolution between specific social and ecological systems." 181 
Indigenous people "see" nature differently, precisely 
because their practices acknowledge its centrality. Studies m 
ethnobotany reveal that people in societies characterized by 
simple technologies are aware of differences in nature which are 
invisible to specialists from outside. Dandier and Sage, for 
example, report that in one Aymara community in the Bolivian 
Altiplano five peasant households named 38 sweet and 9 bitter 
179 Ibid., p. 286. 
180 Norgaard, Richard (1989). op. cit., p. 607. 
181 Ibid., p. 609 .. 
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varieties of potato that they themselves cultivate.18 2 They are 
aware also that each variety possesses advantages and 
disadvantages as part of a strategy for minimizing risks. Their 
interest in maintaining crop diversity is based not on belief in 
diversity for its own sake, but on the knowledge that diversity 
reduces their environmental vulnerability. 
Their knowledge is based on the production of use values 
and the adaptation of their agricultural practices to ecological 
conditions. Indigenous technical knowledge informs these 
practices, in conserving energy, in cultivating crops, m 
combination with animal rearing, and in other 
farming/conservation techniques. 
The use of indigenous knowledge is linked to the strategies 
which the culture has devised for coping with risks. These micro-
level practices protect against attack from pests and genetic 
erosion, through maintaining diversity, in the ecological system, m 
crops and in genetic materials. The components of these 
strategies allow a sustainable system to be reproduced in which 
biological nutrients are conserved, and food consumption meets 
different nutritional needs. At the same time the labor effort 
expended in production and consumption is spread over the 
agricultural calendar. Another important factor is that these 
strategies reduce fluctuations due to seasonality, both in the 
182 Dandier , J. and Sage, C. (1985). "What is Happening to Andean Potatoes? 
A View from the Grassroots," World Development, vol. 13, no. 3 pp. 364-371. 
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habitat and in seasonal vulnerability to disease. Finally, access to 
commonly held resources is linked to the investment which a 
household makes in the community. The strategies adopted do not 
necessarily succeed in ensuring adequate Ii velihoods, but they are 
designed to reduce the risks to those livelihoods.18 3 
To appreciate the potential gains in widening our view of 
environmental management one needs to be aware not only of 
differing epistemological positions, but even of different 
cosmologies. Incorporating the environment into development 
planning implies incorporating cultures and cultural perspectives. 
The problem of how to manage the environment effectively in the 
Third World is usually raised in terms of their cultural 
adaptations to development processes. Perhaps the more urgent 
question is whether "we" are prepared for the cultural adaptation 
that is required of us. The reference to cosmologies was 
deliberate, since the view that people take of their environment 1s 
intimately linked to their conception of their own place in space 
and time. A collection edited by McNeely and Pitt provides 
evidence that people in small-scale societies, the tribal or 
indigenous people who make up 200 million of the world's 
population, often view the environment within a long-term time 
horizon, like many ecologists.184 In pastoral societies, for 
183 Burkey, Stan (1993). People First: A Guide to Self-reliant, Participatory 
Rural Development, Zed Books, New Jersey, p. 34. 
184McNeely, Jeffrey and Pitt, David eds. (1985). Culture and Conservation: 
The Human Dimension in Environmental Planing, Croom Helm, London. 
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example, significant events may be separated by decades. The 
inability to appreciate this fact helps explain why, when people 
judge environmental losses to have become critical, development 
personnel are often the last to know. It is essential to know when 
environmental problems are unsustainable, to people as well as m 
technical terms, and the ans~ers lie partly in cultural 
interpretations of "crisis."185 
Environmental movements and the South 
It is sometimes argued that social movements in developing 
countries are unlikely to embrace environmental demands, since 
the contradictions of the development process leave poor people 
with little option but to make ever increasing demands on their 
resource base. By the end of the Earth Summit, many participants 
and journalists were articulating a simple equation to explain 
complex relationship between environment and development: 
poverty causes environmental degradation.186 They saw 
developing countries and poor people as fixated on survival and 
basic development issues, and if exploitation of natural resources 
contributed to those goals, so be it. 
The growth of new urban environmental movements in the 
Third World demonstrates that such an argument can be 
185 Ekins, Paul (1992). op. cit. pp. 4-12. 
186 Broad, Robin and Cavanagh, John (1993). "Beyond the Myths of Rio," 
World Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 65-73. 
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challenged. The growth of new urban social movements in Latin 
America, for example, clearly owes something to environmental 
consciousness.187 The role of ecological considerations in rural 
social movements in the South is certainly ambiguous, but those 
who constitute the movement are engaged in a livelihood struggle, 
and they recognize that this livelihood struggle can be successful 
only if the environment is managed in a sustainable way. As 
nature is transformed under capitalist development and natural 
resources are created, social struggles are initiated which resist 
the incorporation of nature in wider spheres of accumulation. The 
concern of these movements with the distribution of resources is 
usually linked to ideas about the alternative uses to which they 
could be put. The struggle to create the condition of existence 
necessary for social and biological reproduction, outside the 
spheres of capitalist accumulation and market-oriented resource 
use, is a struggle to effect profound environmental objectives.18 8 
I will examine one of the more known social movements in the 
South. 
The green belt movement in Kenya 
187 See for example, Slater, D. (1985). New Social Movements and the State 
in Latin America, Blackwell, London. 
188 Samatar, Abdi (1993). "Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy? 
Bananas, Boom, and Poverty in Somalia," Economic Geography, vol. 69, no. 
1, pp. 25-43. 
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Support for mass tree planting by Kenyan women began m 
June 1977 on the occasion of World Environment Day. The 
activity was co-ordinated by the National Council of Kenyan 
Women and developed into a program "that approached the issues 
of development holistically and endeavored to build on local 
expertise and capabilities." 189 One of the leading figures in the 
movement, W angari Maathai, has described the genesis of the 
movement in the action which the Women's Committee took 
together with a small group of very poor rural women.190 The 
initial steps toward forming a movement were taken by Kenyan 
women outside the communities; they identified forest losses as 
among the most serious causes of soil erosion and land 
degradation in Kenya. The Green Belt movement has grown 
slowly but surely around a program of reforestation, 
environmental awareness and better livestock and crop 
production.191 
Once contact has been made with community members who 
wish to participate in the movement, they are urged to apply to 
headquarters indicating whether they wish to participate by 
growing tree seedlings or by planting them. The participants then 
carry out certain work before they can receive trees, preparing 
189 Maathai, Wangari (1986). The Green Belt Movement: Building Block for 
Sustainable Development, Overseas Development Institute, London, p.20. 
190 Ibid., p. 25. 
191 Ekins, Paul (1992). op. cit. p. 151. 
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the ground for tree nurseries or digging holes for planting. This 
work is checked by the Green Belt movement field staff. 
Participants in the program then attend meetings to teach 
them fores try techniques, while seedlings are being produced the 
community is being persuaded to plant trees. When the seedlings 
are ready they are distributed to members of the community. In 
this way over 1000 public green belts, each with over one 
thousand trees, have been planted and another 15 ,000 private 
green belts, under the management of small farmers, are 
registered with the movement.19 2 
Since about 90 percent of Kenya's 19 million people live in 
the rural areas and most of them use fuelwood, the demand for 
timber is unlikely to decline. Similarly in urban areas wood 1s 
converted to charcoal for domestic use. In many parts of the 
country soil fertility has fallen and famine has become a recurrent 
phenomenon. This loss of soil fertility is connected with the 
indiscriminate felling of trees and the gradual encroachment on 
forests by human and livestock populations. Forests cover about 
2 percent of the land formerly forested, and over two-thirds of 
Kenya's land area is arid, semi-arid or desert land. Maathai 
argues that tea and coffee plantations should not be developed 
while so much lost land has still not been reclaimed.193 
192 Ibid. 
193 Maathai (1986). op. cit., p. 16. 
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The environmental movement has been discussed in the 
context of wider social struggles to retain control over the natural 
environment, often in the face of opposition from development 
agencies and governments. It is clear from the case discussed that 
there are two essential characteristics of environmental 
movements in the Third World: supported by the people engaged 
in a livelihood struggle, and struggle linked to sustainable 
objectives. Where poor peoples' livelihoods are at stake, 
environmental movements will incorporate conservation 
objectives within the context of basic needs. 
This chapter has argued that environmental management 
must make use of social movements dedicated to environmental 
ends. It must also make use of the knowledge and experience 
which people possess about their environments. The next chapter 
will examine sustainability, for the technical limits of 
sustainability are not fixed. What people can achieve for 
themselves is partly governed by these limits. 
I I I 
CHAPTER 6. THE LIMITS OF SUSTAINABILITY 
Earlier chapters have looked at how the environmental 
consequences of development have posed a contradiction. As the 
environment has become internationalized it has been 
transformed, and social struggles have mounted for the control 
and ownership of natural resources. The attempt to import 
solutions to environmental problems from the North, in the form 
of growth, therefore assumes more importance as the ecological 
crisis of development deepens. In this chapter the discussion 
steps back and examines the theoretical importance of 
sustainability. Particularly, I concentrate on the contradiction of 
growth and sustainability. 
The concept 
The concept of sustainability originated in the discussions of 
renewable resources such as fores ts or fisheries, and has 
subsequently been adopted as a broad slogan by the 
environmental movement.194 Most proponents of sustainability 
therefore take it to mean "the existence of the ecological 
conditions necessary to support human life at a specified level of 
194 Peet, John (1992). Energy and the Ecological Economics of 
Sustainability, Island Press, Washington, DC., pp. 21. 
11 2 
well-being through future generations," what has been called 
ecological sustainability .195 
Since ecological sustainability emphasizes the constraints 
and opportunities that nature presents to human activities, 
ecologists and physical scientists frequently dominate its 
discussion. But what they actually focus on are the ecological 
conditions for ecological sustainability -- the biophysical "laws" or 
patterns that determine environmental responses to human. 
activities and humans' ability to use the environment. This is the 
basis of one of the major contributions of sustainability -- the 
realization that in addition to or in conjunction with the ecological 
conditions, there are social conditions that influence the ecological 
sustainability or unsustainability of the people-nature interaction. 
For example, one could say that soil erosion which undermines the 
agricultural basis for human society is a case of ecological 
( un)sustainability. It could be caused by farming on marginal 
lands without adequate soil conservation measures-- the 
ecological cause. But the phenomenon of marginalization of 
peasants may have social roots, which would then be the social 
cause of ecological unsustainability. 
Emerging from a broad review of the uses of sustainability 
are several general perspectives, or contexts, in which the term 1s 
used. A social definition of sustainability might include the 
195 Brown, Becky, Hanson, M., Liverman, D. and Merideth, R. (1987). 
"Global Sustainability: Toward Definition," Environmental Management, 
vol. 11, no. 6, p. 714. 
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continued satisfaction of basic human needs--food, water, shelter-
- as well as higher-level social and cultural necessities such as 
security, freedom, education, employment, and recreation. I 9 6 
The social perspective is often more concerned with individuals 
than with nations or species. Hence, socially defined sustainability 
might specify the survival and happiness of the maximum needs 
to even the poorest groups. On the other hand, some feel that it is 
against the long-term social good to aim at sustaining everyone 
because certain social groups are too weak or are unwilling to 
control their populations. I 9 7 
Perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed portrait of 
the contours of sustainability has been offered by Lester 
Brown.198 Setting his conception of sustainability against the 
backdrop of destructive and burdensome trends emanating from 
industrialization and economic modernization, Brown defines the 
sustainable society in terms of population stabilization, the 
preservation of the earth's renewable natural resource base, 
prudent use of land (urban, farm and wilderness), the protection 
of biological systems (including fisheries, grasslands and forests), 
the reforestation of the earth, the maintenance of the web of life 
196 Maslow, A.H. (1970). Motivation and Personality, 2nd edn. Harper and 
Row, New York, p.46. 
197 Hardin, Garrett, and J. Baden (1977). Managing the Commons, W.H. 
Freeman, San Francisco: CA, p. 13. 
198 Brown, Lester (1981). Building the Sustainable Society , W.W. Norton 
and Company, NY. 
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from microorganisms to the gene pool to extant species and flora 
and fauna, and the conservation of energy resources through the 
shift to renewable sources of energy. 
What is surprising about this conservationist approach to 
sustainability is that this treatment nowhere specifically defines 
its core meaning. Instead, Brown offers at best a wide ranging 
(but not exhaustive) enumeration of the constituents of societal or 
global sustainability. Moreover, as Paehlke notes, 199 Brown's 
vision of a future sustainable world or society is underpinned by a 
commitment to slowed, but continuing, economic growth. In 
sharing this vision with Brown, two other sustainable future 
advocates, Robert Hamrin,200 and Dennis Pirages,201 make clear 
that their position amounts to a commitment to sustainable 
growth. For example, Hamrin explicitly notes: "The concept of 
sustainable growth encompasses the necessity of continued 
economic growth to meet basic human needs around the globe 
while also underscoring that the growth be of such a nature that it 
can be sustained indefinitely by respecting nature's boundary 
conditions. "202 Likewise, in calling for the social design of 
1 99 Paehlke, Robert ( 1989). Environmentalism and the Future of 
Progressive Politics, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
200 Hamrin, Robert (1983). A Renewable Resource Economy, Praeger 
Publishing, New York. 
201 Pirages, Dennis (1977). "Introduction: A Social Design for Sustainable 
Growth", in Pirages, D. (ed.), The Sustainable Society, Praeger Publishers, 
New York, pp. 1-13. 
202 Hamrin (1983), op. cit., p. 7. 
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sustainable futures on a societal and worldwide scale, Pirages lays 
out an agenda for sustainable growth defined in terms of 
"economic growth that can be supported by physical and social 
environments for the foreseeable future."203 
As Samir Amin,204 one of the most renowned dependency 
theorists of the 1960s observed some years ago, the quarrel over 
the difference between growth and development is no mere 
semantic disagreement. For Amin and other dependency 
theorists, growth is not development, and this distinction becomes 
theoretically and strategically important in peripheral countries 
where economic growth can mask the absence of true economic 
development which has been blocked by relations of dependency 
with core or metropolitan nations of the North. More recently, 
Daly and Cobb205 have recontextualized this point within the 
sustainability debate by defining growth as "quantitative 
expansion in the scope of the physical dimensions of the economic 
system," while defining "development" as qualitative change of a 
physical nongrowing economic system in dynamic equilibrium 
with the environment.206 As they argue, by this definition, the 
earth is not growing but developing. Any physical subsystem of a 
203 Pirages (1977). op. cit., p. 10. 
204 Amin, Samir (1976). Unequal Development, Monthly Press, New York. 
205 Daly, Herman and John Cobb (1989). For the Common Good: Redirecting 
the Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable 
Future, Beacon Press, Boston. 
206 Ibid., p. 71. 
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finite and nongrowing earth must itself also eventually become 
nongrowing. Therefore, growth will become unsustainable 
eventually and the term "sustainable growth" would then be self-
contradictory. But SD, as examined in previous chapters, does not 
become self contradictory .201 
Part of Daly and Cobb's argument against versions of 
sustainable growth is grounded in their effort to find an 
alternative to gross national product (GNP) and net national 
product (NNP) as a measure of sustainability and in their defense 
of "strong sustainability" over "weak sustainability" as the core 
element of SD. Although the elaboration of the former gets into 
some complicated and subtle economic argumentation which will 
not be addressed here, the latter distinction carries our analysis of 
the key concept of sustainability another step further. As against 
the assumptions of Julian Simon208 and the late Herman Kahn that 
postulate the infinite replaceability of finite natural resources by 
humanly created substitutes, Daly and Cobb press their defense of 
strong sustainability by arguing that the latter requires 
"maintaining both humanly created and natural resource capital 
intact separately, on the assumption that they are complements 
rather than substitutes in most production functions."209 The 
207 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
208 Simon, Julian (1981). The Ultimate Resource, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. 
209 Daly and Cobb (1989). op. cit., p. 72. 
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implications of this argument have been echoed by Amory Lovins 
210 in his advocacy of soft energy paths which draw on renewable 
energy income, instead of hard technology paths which exact a 
heavy price in terms of scarce human capital. 
Within the international development literature, clarification 
of the SD concept has been advanced most in the work of Michael 
Redclift. 211 Working from the proposition that SD socially can be 
discerned in part by the dynamics of ecosystems, Redclift shows 
how complex ecosystems, like the tropical rainforests, achieve 
eco-sustainability or homeostatic balance -- what natural 
ecologists call "climax systems" of high diversity, large biomass, 
and high stability -- through protection from rapid change and 
"through shifts of energy flows away from production and 
towards the maintenance of the systems itself. "212 By contrast, he 
notes, human settlements typically seek to stall such ecosystems 
in early stages of ecological succession, where the yield of 
products is high, but where the stabilizing elements of organic 
matter and biomass fail to accumulate. High production within 
these ecosystems, then, comes "at the cost of confounding nature's 
strategy of maximum protection or adaptation."213 
210 Lovins, Amory (1977). Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace, 
Balligner Publishing Co., New York. 
211 Redclift, Michael (1984). Development and the Environmental Crisis: 
Red or Green, Methuen, London. 
212 Ibid., p. 18. 
213 Ibid. 
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This model of ecological sustainability could be adopted to 
SD. Of course, natural ecosystems are not equivalent to social 
systems. Nor are the two ultimately separable. Because the 
relationship between human settlements and nature is one of 
identity and difference, human beings in communities live m 
nature, not with or against nature. Simultaneously, human beings 
in their non-identity with nature have the capacity of reason to 
shape their environment and to develop tools to alter or to adapt 
to their changing environment. Moreover, larger social relations 
and human groupings (organizations, cities, governments, 
economies) in their social and historical configurations can 
strongly influence the compatibility and convergence between 
natural and social systems. 
These philosophical points can be made more concrete by 
considering other arguments put forth by Redclift. A concept of 
SD grounded on the sustainability of natural ecosystems, as 
Redclift suggests, implies a subtle appreciation of the relationship 
between the carrying capacity of the ecosystem and human 
population growth. "The concept of sustainability makes little 
sense," he says, "unless we also consider the impact of population 
growth on the physical resource base."214 Carrying capacity is a 
term engendering much controversy. Daly and Cobb note that 
some question its appropriateness to human beings. As they 
acknowledge, the carrying capacity of the environment for 
2141bid., p. 29. 
119 
animals can be calculated basically in terms of population. Per 
capita resource consumption for animals is both constant over 
time, but animals do not experience economic development. And 
it is constant across individual members of the species, since 
animals do not have rich and poor social classes. 215 Moreover, 
technology for animal species "is a genetic constant, while for 
humans it is a cultural variable."216 
Ecological scarcity may overwhelms the ability of human 
ingenuity and industry to expand the capacity of the ecosystem to 
carry ever larger populations of human beings at a decent quality 
of life. Nevertheless, the problem of overpopulation for the world 
today in terms of sustainability, as Redclift argues, "is not so much 
the net increase in population at the global level, but the rate of 
change in population in the most critical regions."217 Clearly, 
crucial to ecological sustainability in those areas of the world 
experiencing the highest rates of population growth are policies 
fostering improved environmental security- i.e.. practices that 
preserve indigenous natural resources and prevent environmental 
degradation.218 
Further, Redclift makes evident, the difficulties of those 
countries of the South in achieving environmental security and 
215 Daly and Cobb (1989). op. cit., p. 136. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Redclift (1984)., op. cit., p. 133. 
218 Ibid., p. 32 
120 
promoting SD programs originate for the most part in models of 
industrial and agricultural modernization and programs like the 
"Green Revolution" imported from the North and perpetuated by 
the finite nature of the energy subsidy provided by depletable oil 
and natural gas supplies for our wasteful and environmentally 
destructive forms of modern industrial and agricultural 
production. More generally, the continuing impact of relations of 
domination and subordination within an unfolding global political 
economy poses some of the most daunting problems for movmg 
towards global sustainability, as previously discussed. 
I 2 I 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the environment and development 
1s complex. In examining the concept of SD it was suggested that 
the term could express more than a pious hope, but rather less 
than a rigorous analytical framework. SD is a concept which 
draws on two opposed traditions: one concerned with the limits 
which nature presents to human beings, the other with the 
potential for human material development which is locked up m 
nature. Unraveling and deconstructing these concepts has been 
the primary focus of this thesis. SD, if it is not to be devoid of 
analytical content, means more than seeking compromise between 
the natural environment and the pursuit of economic growth. It 
should mean a definition of development which recognizes the 
limits of sustainability from the Northern perspective. 
It was suggested that the problem in achieving SD was 
related to the overriding structures of the international economic 
system, which arose out of the exploitation of environmental 
resources, and which frequently operate as constraints on the 
achievement of long-term sustainable practices. 
The first inconsistency that lies dormant within SD is: if we 
cannot rely upon market forces to sustain our environment, we 
need to place greater reliance on international agreement and 
planning, without which individual, personal or national, interests 
will dictate the course of the development process.219 In 
219 See Marien, Michael (1992). "Environmental Problems and Sustainable 
Futures," Futures October 1992, pp. 731-757. 
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discussing environmental management it was argued that most 
planned, environmental interventions are quite unlike this. Most 
interventions in the development process on behalf of the 
environment are motivated by a desire to minimize the 
"externality" effects of development, rather than to provide 
lessons in how development can refocus on sustainability. Where 
environmental considerations clash with strategic, political or 
national interests, they are unceremoniously for gotten. 
Development policy and practice have environmental effects that 
are indirect and consequently ignored. The debt crisis in Latin 
America and Africa is a vivid illustration of a problem with 
serious environmental implications and causes which are 
routinely considered in exclusively economic, even financial 
terms. 
A second inconsistency concerns the relationship between 
the political struggles over the environment in developed and 
developing countries. In seeking sustainability in the North we 
are seeking to affirm a cluster of related values, concerning the 
way in which we want our environment to be preserved. We 
seek, with millions of other people in the developed world, to 
protect and conserve rural space, to recognize aesthetic values in 
the countryside, to provide better access to this space and to 
ensure the biological survival of threatened species. 
Environmental objectives in the South are rather different. The 
123 
survival of the species is equally important, although possibly for 
more crudely economic reasons. Otherwise the environment is 
contested for different reasons. The environment, especially the 
rural environment, is a contested domain in the South because it 
is the sphere in which value is created through the application of 
human labor to nature. If people are to increase their share of 
material rewards in developing countries, it follows that they 
must extend their control over the environment, or over the way 
in which technology transforms the environment. 
At this point it is important to remember that the 
environment has an international character. As Trainer has 
observed, the material standards of life in the developed countries 
are intimately linked with the way resources and human labor are 
exploited in the South.220 It is not left to people in the South to 
decide how to use their resources. A reduction in the amount 
consumption, for example, in the industrialized countries can be 
hailed as a step on the way to more ecological solutions.221 
Whether or not development is necessarily unsustainable as 
argued by UNEP, it is clearly unsustainable on current models for 
many of those livelihoods are made in the South, and for reasons 
that lie outside their control. 
This thesis has discussed numerous aspects of development 
which present barriers to sustainability. It has been argued that 
220 Trainer, F.E. (1986). Abandon Affluence!, Zed Books, London, p. 12. 
221 Ekins, Paul ed. (1986). The Living Economy, Routledge, New York, intro. 
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scientific knowledge is developed in ways that make it difficult to 
assimilate and utilize the experience of the poor people who 
depend upon the environment for their survival. The attachment 
to technological solutions is explicit in terms of the failure to 
derive relevant knowledge from relevant practice and to exercise 
the political will necessary to generate global recovery. 
Anticipatory environmental planning and regulatory practice have 
a role to play in ameliorating the negative effects of development, 
but they cannot hope to overcome the barriers to sustainability 
contained in current development practice. Unless we are 
prepared to reexamine Western assumptions and practices 
concerning both development and the environment, and give 
political effect to the conclusions reached, the reality of 
unsustainable development will remain, and the risk of ecological 
destruction will increase. 
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